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The Future of Insider Trading after Salman: 
Perpetuation of a Flawed Analysis or a Return to 
Basics 
CHARLES W. MURDOCK† 
In large part due to two poorly reasoned decisions by Justice Powell in the early 1980s, Chiarella v. U. S. and Dirks v. 
SEC, the development of insider trading law has been constrained, enforcement has been hampered, and insider-trading 
has grown to the point where hundreds of millions of dollars are at stake. Moreover, Chiarella and Dirks were inconsistent 
with the Congressional policy that the purpose of the securities laws is to ensure a level playing field where one 
participant does not have an undue advantage over another participant. 
A Second Circuit decision, U.S. v. Newman unnecessarily extended Dirks, notwithstanding Congress’s caution to 
constrain the Dirks decision to its unique set of facts. Newman reversed the conviction of hedge fund portfolio managers 
who made millions of dollars by trading on inside information on the basis that they did not know the benefit that the 
tippers who provided that information had received in connection with their tips. Newman further cast doubt on whether 
a benefit can be relational, rather than pecuniary.  
Recent insider trading prosecutions reflect the fact that insider trading today is big business. Hedge funds are under 
intense pressure to get an “edge” to enhance their returns, even if it means resorting to a “black edge.” As Sheelah 
Kolhatkar, the author of Black Edge, a three-year study of the skulduggery that inheres in much of the hedge fund 
industry, noted the basic problem with Newman “is that it completely misunderstood the way the world actually works.” 
For the Newman court, defendants’ lack of culpability stemmed from the fact that “Newman and Chiasson were several 
steps removed from the corporate insiders and there was no evidence that either was aware of the source of the inside 
information.” 
The Newman court failed to realize that this is the way the game is played. The portfolio manager orders trades, which 
make millions for the organization and indirectly for the analysts and others who feed information to the portfolio 
manager. All of these people are aware of the risks of insider trading and, when a dark edge is employed, want to 
obfuscate insider trading as much as possible. The key for the portfolio manager is to inform the analysts that he wants 
the best possible information, but does not want to know how they get it. 
Shortly after Newman, the Supreme Court decided Salman v. U.S., which involved a fairly pedestrian situation in which 
one family member tipped another. However, the Supreme Court declined to adopt the requirement in Newman that there 
must be something of a “pecuniary or valuable nature” in a gift to family or friends in order for the gift rationale in 
insider trading to apply.  
Salman was then followed by U.S. v. Martoma, where SAC Capital Advisors realized $80.3 million in gains and avoided 
$194.6 million in losses by obtaining advance notice that the Alzheimer study was flawed. The portfolio manager who 
obtained the information from a participant in the study received a $9 million bonus. Martoma, in first analyzing Salman, 
opined that Salman in effect also rejected Newman’s requirement of a “meaningfully close personal relationship” in 
order to use the gift approach. The Martoma court later amended its opinion and looked at the basis for requiring a 
“meaningfully close personal relationship,” namely, that there must be evidence of “a relationship between the insider 
and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the latter.”  
This Article provides an extensive analysis of the history of insider trading, and the policies underlying the law, and 
demonstrates that the pre-Chiarella/Dirks law was much more consistent with the Congressional policy of a level playing 
field. Hopefully, Salman and Martoma reflect a more realistic approach to the law of insider trading. It is critical for 
courts to understand the pressures to receive illegal information, the chain through which it travels, where it must end in 
order to be operational, and the devices employed to disguise the illegal sources that are often used. Courts also need to 
understand that much of the world operates on networking and relationships, and that people are motivated by factors 
other than immediate pecuniary gain. 
  
 
 †  Professor and Loyola Faculty Scholar, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Salman v. United States,1 
generated headlines like “Supreme Court Sides with Prosecutors”2 and 
“Supreme Court Sets Tough Insider Trading Rule,”3 suggesting that Salman 
provided a substantial boost for the government in regulating insider trading. 
However, Salman was a minimalist decision and, at first glance, seemed to do 
little to define the scope of insider trading or to remedy or clarify the confusing 
and illogical jurisprudence in this area. The Court relied upon what was 
essentially an aside in Dirks v. Securities,4 a poorly reasoned decision that relied 
upon the equally poorly-reasoned decision in Chiarella v. United States.5  
However, Salman did repudiate the part of the United States v. Newman 
holding that required that a tipper “must also receive something of a ‘pecuniary 
or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to family or friends.”6 
Building upon Salman’s repudiation of Newman, the Second Circuit in United 
States v. Martoma also constrained the requirement in Newman that there must 
be a “meaningfully close personal relationship” between the tipper and the 
tippee in a “gift” situation by focusing upon the underlying basis for the personal 
benefit requirement, namely, that there be either a quid pro quo or an intent to 
benefit, and by taking a broad view of personal benefit, in contradistinction to 
that taken by Newman. 7 The position by the Second Circuit in Martoma could 
most likely have resulted in the conviction of the defendants in Newman. 
To understand insider trading law and why the circuit courts in Newman 
and Salman could issue arguably conflicting opinions, leading to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Salman, and also to understand why the Second Circuit 
backed off from Newman in Martoma, one needs a historical and policy 
perspective. This Article will first look at the reason why the securities laws 
were enacted and the early, liberal view of insider trading.8 It will then examine 
and critique the supposedly conservative but actually reactionary trilogy of 
decisions in this area that the Supreme Court handed down in the 1980s,9 and 
the aftermath of these decisions, including the dramatic uptick in insider 
 
 1. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
 2. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Sides with Prosecutors in Insider Trading Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/business/dealbook/supreme-court-insider-trading.html. 
 3. Richard Wolf & Kevin McCoy, Supreme Court Sets Tough Insider Trading Rule, USA TODAY (Dec. 
6, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/12/06/supreme-court-insider-trading/94567078/.  
 4. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 5. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 6. Salman, 137 S.Ct at 428 (quoting United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2014)).  
 7. United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 2017), amended 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting 
Newman, 773 F.3d at 452). 
 8. See Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of the Supreme Court’s Rule 10b-5 Jurisprudence: Protecting 
Fraud at the Expense of Investors (Feb. 18, 2012) (unpublished paper) (on file with author). 
 9. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222; see also Dirks, 463 U.S. 646; Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 
(1987); Murdock, supra note 8. 
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trading,10 the congressional response,11 and the relationship of the 
jurisprudential mischief between these trilogies to the 
Newman/Salman/Martoma conflict. This Article concludes that the “liberal” 
approach of the 1960s would create no more ambiguity and confusion than the 
course chosen by the Supreme Court in its decisions from the1980s. Moreover, 
a liberal approach would be far more in line with the legislative policy 
preferences reflected in the securities laws enacted by Congress after the market 
excesses of the 1920s, and would stem the massive insider trading that followed 
these later decisions.  
From a policy perspective, Congress has clearly stated the critical 
importance of fairness in our securities markets: 
In order to raise the enormous sums of investment capital that will be needed 
in the years ahead and to assure that that capital is properly allocated among 
competing uses, these markets must continue to operate fairly and 
efficiently.12 
For the securities markets to operate “fairly and efficiently,” Congress has 
recognized the following goals of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act: 
The basic goals of the Exchange Act remain salutatory and unchallenged: 
To provide fair and honest mechanisms for the pricing of securities, to assure 
that dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages 
among investors, to ensure that securities can be purchased and sold at 
economically efficient transaction costs, and to provide, to the maximum 
degree practicable, markets that are open and orderly.13 
 The Supreme Court itself has recognized that history teaches us “how 
essential it is that the highest ethical standards prevail in every facet of the 
securities industry.”14 However, to revert to a sound approach regarding insider 
trading, the Supreme Court will need to either abandon its personal benefit test 
in assessing whether a tipper has “sinned,” or follow the lead of the Second 
Circuit in Martoma that, in a situation where an insider makes a gift of material, 
non-public inside information to anyone when the purpose is to enable the tippee 
to trade, such conduct is illegal. If neither of these possibilities materialize, then 
either the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or Congress should adopt 
a definition of insider trading akin to that proposed in the 1980s. 
I. THE EARLY JURISPRUDENCE ON INSIDER TRADING 
The leading insider trading case for a number of years was not a judicial 
decision, but rather a 1961 SEC decision: In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co.15 
 
 10. JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 16 (1991). 
 11. Insider Trading Sanction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified as amended 
in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988)); Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act Of 
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 12. H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91 (1975) (Conf. Rep.). 
 13. Id. 
 14. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau. Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186–87 (1963). 
 15. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
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The significance of Cady, Roberts is attested to by the fact that the majorities in 
both Chiarella and Dirks relied upon the case as the leading one dealing with 
insider trading, but grossly misinterpreted that decision.16 Congress also viewed 
Cady, Roberts as seminal.17 
A. THE CADY, ROBERTS DECISION—A SOUND RESULT BASED UPON SOUND 
POLICY AND JURISPRUDENCE 
Both the Chiarella and Dirks majority opinions misunderstood the 
significance of the critically important facts of Cady, Roberts. First, Cady, 
Roberts was a “bad news” case; that is, the triggering event was a decision by 
the Board of Directors of Curtiss-Wright to cut the dividend.18 Such a negative 
development would typically result in a market price drop, which would then 
motivate unscrupulous “insiders” to sell their shares before the bad news became 
public.19  
On the other hand, a “good news” situation, such as a dividend increase, or 
an incredible discovery of ore,20 could raise the market price of the stock. In a 
“good news” situation, unscrupulous “insiders” could be expected to purchase 
company stock. However, the only persons from whom the insider could 
purchase stock would be existing shareholders to whom, 21 arguably, the insider 
had a fiduciary duty.22  
Contrariwise, when an insider sells stock, there is a high likelihood that 
persons who previously did not hold the stock (that is, non-shareholders) would 
 
 16. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 17. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 2287 (1983). 
 18. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 908–09. 
 19. See generally Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494 (1969). 
 20. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (1968). 
 21. See, e.g., Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968) (in which insiders also purchased shares from 
the corporation). 
 22. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 434 (1909) (holding that defendant director and owner of stock and 
administrator general of the company had an obligation to make disclosures to the stockholder); Oliver v. Oliver, 
118 Ga. 362, 368 (1903) (“If, however, the fact within the knowledge of the director is of a character calculated 
to affect the selling price, and can, without detriment to the interest of the company, be imparted to the 
shareholder, the director, before he buys, is bound to make a full disclosure. In a certain sense the information 
is a quasi asset of the company, and the shareholder is as much entitled to the advantage of that sort of an asset 
as to any other regularly entered on the list of the company’s holdings. If the officer should purposely conceal 
from a stockholder information as to the existence of valuable property belonging to the company, and take 
advantage of this concealment, the sale would necessarily be set aside.”); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 
363 (1933) (“[W]here a director personally seeks a stockholder for the purpose of buying his shares without 
making disclosure of material facts within his particular knowledge and not within the reach of the stockholder, 
the transaction will be closely scrutinized and relief may be granted in appropriate instances.”) (holding that 
defendants owed no duty to plaintiff shareholders because the identity of the sellers of the stock were unknown 
and could not be readily ascertained by defendant directors). 
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be among the purchasers.23 Under the common law, there was no recognized 
duty of officers or directors to non-shareholders.24 
This is highly significant because the individual defendant in Cady, 
Roberts argued that “an insider’s responsibility is limited to existing 
stockholders and that he has no special duties when sales of securities are made 
to non-stockholders.”25 In rejecting this argument, the SEC stated that “[t]his 
approach is too narrow. It ignores the plight of the buying public—wholly 
unprotected from the misuse of special information.”26 The Court expanded 
upon this policy concern by stating: 
There is no valid reason why persons who purchase stock from an officer, 
director or other person having the responsibilities of an ‘insider’ should not 
have the same protection afforded by disclosure of special information as 
persons who sell stock to them. Whatever distinctions may have existed at 
common law based on the view that an officer or director may stand in a 
fiduciary relationship to existing stockholders from whom he purchases but 
not to members of the public to whom he sells, it is clearly not appropriate 
to introduce these into the broader anti-fraud concepts embodied in the 
securities acts.27 
At this time, case law took the same position. In Gratz v. Claughton, Judge 
Learned Hand, a highly regarded jurist, stated: 
For many years a grave omission in our corporation law had been its 
indifference to dealings of directors or other corporate officers in the shares 
of their companies. When they bought shares, they came literally within the 
conventional prohibitions of the law of trusts; yet the decisions were 
strangely slack in so deciding. When they sold shares, it could indeed be 
argued that they were not dealing with a beneficiary, but with one whom his 
purchase made a beneficiary. That should not, however, have obscured the 
fact that the director or officer assumed a fiduciary relation to the buyer by 
the very sale; for it would be a sorry distinction to allow him to use the 
advantage of his position to induce the buyer into the position of a 
beneficiary, although he was forbidden to do so, once the buyer had become 
one.28 
Refusing to let common law concepts determine results under securities 
laws makes preeminent sense because securities laws were enacted due to the 
common law’s inability to ensure fair and orderly securities markets.29 The 
purpose of the securities laws was to “ensure the fair and honest functioning of 
impersonal national securities markets where common-law protections have 
 
 23. It is of course possible that an existing shareholder might increase his or her position. 
 24. Goodwin arguably determined that there is not a duty to shareholders in a publicly traded corporation 
where an insider purchases stock. A fortiori, there would not be a duty to non-shareholders. Goodwin, 283 Mass. 
at 361.  
 25. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 (1961). 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. (third and fourth emphases added). 
 28. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951). 
 29. See supra text accompanying notes 26–28; see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 248 
(1980) (the purpose of the securities was to “ensure the fair and honest functioning of impersonal national 
securities markets where common-law protections have proved inadequate.”) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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proved inadequate.”30 Congress itself stated that the purpose of securities laws 
was “to assure that dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or 
advantages among investors.”31 Professor Louis Loss, a noted scholar in the 
securities field, asserted that Congress, in enacting the 1934 Securities Exchange 
Act, sought to prevent inequitable and unfair practices and to ensure fairness in 
securities transactions generally, whether conducted face-to-face, over-the-
counter, or on an exchange.32 It makes little sense to rely upon common law 
jurisprudence to interpret securities laws when such jurisprudence was, in effect, 
rebuked by the enactment of the remedial jurisprudence embodied in the 
securities laws. 
Cady, Roberts was significant in two other aspects. First, it recognized that 
the concept of “insider,” or one who has special duties under the securities laws, 
was not limited to “officers, directors and control shareholders,” but includes 
“those persons who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to its 
internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its 
securities.”33 The Court pejoratively added that “[i]ntimacy demands restraint 
less the uninformed be exploited.”34 
The SEC opinion in Cady, Roberts proposed the following test to 
determine the persons upon whom a special obligation is imposed, which 
requires: (1) “the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, 
to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for 
the personal benefit of anyone,” and (2) “the inherent unfairness involved where 
a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those 
with whom he is dealing.”35 
Second, and arguably more important, in the context of tipper/tippee, the 
tipper in Cady, Roberts was guiltless because he breached neither a common law 
duty, nor any special obligation imposed by the securities laws. Cowden, who 
was a director of Curtiss-Wright, was present at a board meeting in which a 
dividend cut was approved. The secretary of the company was instructed to 
make the appropriate disclosures to Dow Jones and the New York Stock 
Exchange and left the room to do so. Sometime later, the board took a break and 
it was then that Cowden telephoned Gintel, his colleague at Cady, Roberts, and 
mentioned the dividend cut. 36 
The Cady, Roberts opinion noted that, “there was no evidence of a 
preconceived plan whereby Cowden was to ‘leak’ advance information 
[to] . . . Gintel,” and that “the evidence points to the conclusion that Cowden 
probably assumed, without thinking about it, that the dividend action was 
 
 30. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 31. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91 (1975) (Conf. Rep.)).  
 32. LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 1455–56 (2d ed. 1961). 
 33. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 917. 
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already a matter of public information and further that he called registrant’s 
office to find out the effect of the dividend news upon the market.”37  
Thus, in Cady, Roberts, the tipper did not sin, that is, receive any sort of 
pecuniary benefit. Nonetheless, the tippee was found to have violated Rule 10b-
5.38 Contrast this approach to that taken by the Supreme Court in Dirks, where 
the Court held that a tippee does not “sin” unless the tipper sins, and that the 
tipper only sins when he or she obtains a pecuniary or other benefit.39 
B. TEXAS GULF SULPHUR—QUESTIONABLE ANALYSIS, BUT SOUND POLICY 
The next significant decision in the development of insider trading was the 
Second Circuit’s opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur.40 The case was arguably the 
apogee of the judicial expansion of Rule 10b-5 and much of its sloppy semantics 
have been rejected today.41 Its most problematic language was the use of the 
phrase “disclose or abstain,”42 instead of the more accurate phraseology, 
“abstain until disclosable.” In almost every situation in which the phrase 
“disclose or abstain” has been used, suggesting that the insider has an option, 
there is invariably an obligation not to disclose; thus, there is not an option for 
alternative courses of action, but rather a duty not to trade while the information 
remains nonpublic. Nonetheless, Texas Gulf Sulfur has been cited positively by 
Congress and its result on the insider trading aspect is sound and would be 
followed today. 43 
Texas Gulf Sulphur was actually a two-act play. The first act covered the 
period from November 12 to April 16, which involved insider trading by 
employees and officers of Texas Gulf Sulphur.44 The second act covered the 
period from April 12 through April 16 and involved the company’s disclosure 
obligations under the securities laws.45 
 
 37. Id. at 908. 
 38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
 39. See infra Subpart II.B. 
 40. SEC. v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 41. In discussing materiality, the court vacillated between using the word “may” and “would,” and 
“possible” versus “probable.” Id. at 848–50. (“[T]he materiality of facts is to be assessed solely by measuring 
the effect the knowledge of the facts would have upon prudent or conservative investors . . . Thus, material facts 
include not only information disclosing the earnings and distributions of a company but also those facts which 
affect the probable future of the company and those which may affect the desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold 
the company’s securities.”) Id. at 849. The Supreme Court, in TSC Indus. v. Northway, opted for the 
would/probable standard as opposed to the might/possible standard. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). With respect to 
scienter, the standard for liability in an SEC enforcement proceeding was merely whether the press release issued 
by the Corporation “resulted from a lack of due diligence.” Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d. at 863. This is, in 
effect, a negligence standard, whereas the Supreme Court, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, required some degree 
of intentionality. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Later, this has been interpreted as a recklessness standard. McLean v. 
Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 42. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848. 
 43. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 2287 (1983). 
 44. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 841. 
 45. Id. at 857–64. 
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As a result of drilling operations in Timmins, Ontario, Canada, the 
company raised a core of ore that indicated a substantial, if not extraordinary, 
field of valuable metals.46 However, management wanted to verify the mineral 
find with additional testing and acquire additional mineral leases in the area.47 
Drilling was suspended while the company obtained more definitive analyses 
and mineral leases.48 The employees who were aware of the find were instructed 
not to disclose it, not even to other employees and officers of the company.49  
Nevertheless, several employees and officers bought Texas Gulf Sulphur 
stock during this period and the first act dealt with their liability for the alleged 
insider trading. Drilling was resumed on March 31, 1964.50 An arguably 
misleading press release was issued on April 12, 1964,51 and the second act 
ended on April 16, 1964, when Texas Gulf Sulphur issued a corrective press 
release.52  
The individual defendants either purchased Texas Gulf Sulphur’s stock, or 
called or tipped to others who did. Citing Cady, Roberts, the court set forth the 
following standard by which the individual defendants would be judged: 
The essence of the Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own account in 
the securities of a corporation has ‘access, directly or indirectly, to 
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for 
the personal benefit of anyone’ may not take ‘advantage of such information 
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing,’ i.e., the investing 
public.53 
The court added the following, which became known as the “disclose or 
abstain” rule: 
Thus, anyone in possession of material inside information must either 
disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in 
order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must 
abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such 
inside information remains undisclosed.54 
 
 46. Id. at 843. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 843. 
 50. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d. at 844. 
 51. The press release stated that reports and rumors of a substantial copper discovery were exaggerated by 
people not connected with Texas Gulf Sulphur (TGS) and that “[t]he work done to date has not been sufficient 
to reach definite conclusions and any statement as to size and grade of ore would be premature and possibly 
misleading.” Id. at 845. The trial court called the press release “gloomy or incomplete.” Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 
258 F. Supp. 262, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that “the release was issued 
in a manner reasonably calculated to affect the market price of TGS stock and influence the investing public” 
and remanded to the district court to determine whether the release was misleading such that the court should 
issue an injunction against TGS. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 864.  
 52. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d. at 850 n.13. It’s unclear why TGS felt the need to issue the April 12 
release and did not simply wait four days. Alternatively, TGS could have avoided a lot of trouble by issuing the 
April 16 release on the 12th, instead of the gloomy one. 
 53. Id. at 848. 
 54. Id. (emphasis added). 
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The court recognized that disclosure may be “forbidden by the legitimate 
corporate objective of acquiring options to purchase the land surrounding the 
exploration site.”55 In such a situation, “if the information was, as the SEC 
contends, material, its possessors should have kept out of the market until 
disclosure was accomplished.”56 Consequently, as asserted above, the Texas 
Gulf Sulfur court should have described the obligation as “abstain until 
disclosable.” This latter phrasing would not have supported the plaintiff’s later 
argument that once the insider did not abstain, he or she had the obligation to 
disclose, and the failure to disclose caused plaintiffs’ loss.57 
While the language throughout the Texas Gulf Sulfur opinion could have 
been more precise, the legal standard was clear and unambiguous: if you receive 
material, non-public information because your “access” to information intended 
to be available only for a corporate purpose, you may not trade until such 
information is disclosed to other potential investors. This standard comports 
with the purpose of the securities laws, as stated by Congress, “to ensure that 
dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among 
investors.”58 It also reflected the policy that the SEC later promulgated in 
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD),59 requiring prompt disclosure of inside 
information that is intentionally or inadvertently selectively transmitted. 
The Texas Gulf Sulphur standard would have foreclosed the subsequent 
argument about whether the source of information received a “benefit” in 
transmitting information. If the trader has scienter—that is, knows that the 
information is non-public—it is immaterial from a “fairness in trading” 
perspective whether the source of information “misappropriated” it,60 sold it,61 
or gifted it.62 If the tipper was duped into conveying the information,63 the issue 
should be the scienter of the tippee, not the benefit of the tipper and the tippee, 
as in Cady, Roberts, which would violate the securities laws irrespective of the 
“sin,” or lack thereof, by the tipper. 
C. EARLY OPPOSITION TO INSIDER TRADING ENFORCEMENT 
The foregoing discussion is not to suggest that there was not some 
opposition to the early liberal development of insider trading. Henry Manne, 
originally at the University of Rochester and later the Dean of George Mason 
 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Mitchell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 106 (10th Cir. 1971) (awarding damages in the 
amount that it would have taken a reasonable person to reinvest in the market after the timely release of 
information in an action for recovery after investors sold stock as a result of a misleading press release).  
 58. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 248 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 
98-229, at 91 (1975) (Conf. Rep.). 
 59. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2012). 
 60. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241. 
 61. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27–28 (1987); PAULE CONSTANT, TRADING SECRETS (Betsy 
Wing trans., Univ. of Neb. Press 2001). 
 62. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 429 (2016). 
 63. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 167–68 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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Law School,64 is sometimes regarded as the father of law and economics,65 and 
was an aggressive critic of insider trading enforcement.66 According to Professor 
Manne, insider trading is a victimless crime, moves the market in the right 
direction, and constitutes a sound way to reward executives for outstanding 
performance.67 While some economists shared his view, this was definitely a 
minority position.68  
First of all, Professor Manne is correct that insider trading pushes the 
market in the right direction. If an insider buys on positive information (good 
news) prior to the disclosure of such information, the additional buying pressure 
would move the price of the stock upward toward where it should be after the 
market absorbs the “good news.” Similarly, when an insider sells prior to the 
disclosure of adverse information (bad news), increasing the supply of securities 
offered for sale will decrease the price of the stock, and later disclosure will 
move the price toward a lower equilibrium. 
For example, the stock in Curtiss-Wright, the company whose stock was 
traded in the Cady, Roberts case, was trending around 40 before the dividend 
cut was announced. Trading in the stock was suspended after the announcement 
because of the large number of sell orders and, after trading was resumed, the 
stock closed at just below 35.69 However, moving the market in the right 
direction is not a justification for introducing inherent unfairness into the trading 
system. 
According to Professor Manne, when the insider buys on undisclosed 
positive information, the seller on the other side of the transaction is advantaged 
because the purchase by the insider raises the price of the stock and the seller 
gets a higher price than would otherwise be the case. As a rough illustration, if 
a specialist or market maker were quoting 40 bid, 40½ asked, a seller at that 
point would receive 40. However, if the insider intervened to buy, the insider 
would buy at 40½, which could lead to a rise in the market to 40½ bid, 41 asked. 
The seller would then receive 40½, instead of 40. 
 
 64. Known today as the Antonin Scalia Law School.   
 65. Henry G. Manne, ’52, 1928-2015, UNIV. OF CHI. L. SCH., https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/henry-
g-manne-52-1928-2015 (last visited July 27, 2019). 
 66. Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and Property Rights in New Information, 4 CATO J. 933 (1985). 
 67. Id. 
 68. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 states: 
A modest number of economists and academics defend the practice of insider trading as 
promoting an efficient market. Some free market economists even favor legalizing insider trading. 
They argue that the faster the market price reflects the nonpublic information, the more smoothly the 
market functions. But the far greater number of commentators support efforts to curb insider trading, 
viewing such efforts as crucial to the capital formation process that depends on investor confidence 
in the fairness and integrity of our securities markets. Insider trading damages the legitimacy of the 
capital market and diminishes the public’s faith. 
H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 6045 (1988). When I was enrolled in his Law & Economics professional 
program at Dartmouth, I offered to debate him on these issues, but he never responded. While it might be 
unfair to do this postmortem, his position is both simplistic and unsound. 
 69. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 908–10 (1961).  
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The fallacy in the argument that no one is injured from insider trading is 
that it assumes that any injury, if there be one, must be to the person on the 
opposite side of the transaction. This is a situation that would exist in a face-to-
face transaction. For example, in Kardon v. National Gypsum,70 two brothers 
bought stock at a low price without disclosing the favorable impending sale of 
assets, knowing of the opportunity to sell the assets of the company at a favorable 
price. Thus, the party on the other side was the injured one. 
But with respect to a publicly traded stock, numerous investors may be 
trading at the same time and much of their stock would likely be held in street 
name, thus rendering it difficult to determine who on the other side of the 
transaction might be injured. Moreover, there is a serious problem with 
causation, in that the decision by the person on the other side of the transaction 
to trade could be based upon a multitude of factors.  
However, paradoxically, in the public markets, the persons injured by the 
insider’s trading arguably are the persons on the same side of the market. In a 
bad news situation, such as in Cady, Roberts, the insider always sells at a price 
that is higher than subsequent sellers receive after the adverse information is 
disclosed. Conversely, in a “good news” situation, the insider always buys ahead 
of the market, and the price the insider pays will be lower than the price after 
disclosure of the positive information. Unfortunately, this reality does not easily 
translate into a computation of damages for the sellers or buyers who come to 
the market after the insider trades.  
Consequently, a private cause of action for insider trading in impersonal 
public markets is arguably neither feasible nor realistic and, consequently, 
enforcement falls to the U.S. Attorneys and the SEC in criminal and enforcement 
proceedings.71  
The argument that insider trading is a form of executive compensation also 
fails. It is predicated on the notion that a rise in the price of stock reflects the 
quality of management. While that may be true in some instances, history has 
shown that there often is a negative correlation between a rise in stock prices 
and the quality of management. There are many instances of management 
hyping the price of the stock, bailing out, and leaving other shareholders to bear 
the subsequent drop in price.72 
Prescinding fraud situations, consider the situation of a corporation with 
three divisions, two of which are expecting an exceptional improvement in 
earnings, while a third division is poorly managed and has no earnings growth. 
The overall effect, companywide, is a substantial increase in the earnings of the 
 
 70. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947). 
 71. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (“Private enforcement of proxy rules provides a 
necessary supplement to Commission action. . . . The Commission advises that it examines over 2,000 proxy 
statements annually and each of them must be necessarily expedited. Time does not permit an independent 
examination of the facts set out in the proxy material and this results in the Commission’s acceptance of the 
representations contained therein at their face value.”).  
 72. Charles W. Murdock, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and Particularity: Why Are Some 
Courts in an Alternate Universe?, 45 LOY. UNIV. CHI. L.J. 615 (2014). 
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company. Assume that the chief operating officers of each division are privy to 
the company’s financial information. If all three trade ahead of the release of 
earnings, all three will profit handsomely, but not even Professor Manne could 
argue that the poor manager deserved the benefits of his insider trading. 
Moreover, even Justice Powell, who wrote the restrictive opinions in Chiarella 
and Dirks, acknowledged that “[a] significant purpose of the Exchange Act was 
to eliminate the idea that use of inside information for personal advantage was a 
normal emolument of corporate office.”73 
 The situation would be all the more egregious in a bad news situation 
where all three executives are performing poorly, but liquidate their holdings 
before disclosure of the poor earnings and avoid a substantial loss.74 
Another criticism of the liberal development of insider trading in private 
damages flowed from the adoption of the “disclose or abstain” mantra in Texas 
Gulf Sulphur by other federal courts in private actions.75 Under the “disclose or 
abstain” mantra, since the insider did not abstain, plaintiffs argued that he 
therefore had an obligation to disclose and, that by not disclosing, the insider 
caused injury to the other investors who traded in the market without the benefit 
of the undisclosed information.76 Texas Gulf Sulphur was a “good news” case: 
when the insider bought at 29 without disclosing the extraordinary mineral find, 
sellers in the market would assert he or she would not have sold at 29, but rather 
at a price of 40, to which the stock rose after disclosure.77  
It soon became apparent that this theory of liability could have “draconian” 
consequences.78 In Fridrich, two sets of plaintiffs brought suit against a 
defendant who purchased stock with knowledge of an impending merger that 
would increase the value of the company stock.79 One set of plaintiffs, Woosley, 
purchased their stock in the company in 1967.80 The defendant, Bradford, 
purchased 1225 shares of stock on April 27, 1972.81 The other set of plaintiffs, 
Fridrich, purchased stock in May 1972.82 Both sets of plaintiffs sold in June 1972 
at a small profit, while Bradford sold his shares on July 27, 1972, realizing a 
profit of $13,000 on the transaction.83 
The district court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages during 
the period of nondisclosure measured by “[t]he highest bid value reached by Old 
 
 73. Dirks v. SEC., 463 U.S. 646, 654 n.10 (1983) (quoting Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 912, n.15). 
 74. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969). 
 75. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971). 
 76. Id. at 95–96 (“Reynolds, Mitchell and the Stouts testified that they sold their TGS stock after hearing 
of the April 12th release but before becoming aware of the April 16th release. . . . Later that afternoon he learned 
of the favorable TGS report. He testified that had he known of the K-55-1 core results he would have doubled 
his holdings.”). 
 77. Id. at 103 (explaining these rises in price and their effect on the market). 
 78. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 309 (6th Cir. 1976). 
 79. Id. at 310. 
 80. Id. at 311. 
 81. Id. at 308. 
 82. Id. at 311. 
 83. Id. at 308.  
J - MURDOCK_19 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2019  6:40 PM 
1560 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1547 
Line stock within a period of 20 days following the SEC’s [disclosure] action on 
November 10, 1972, disclosing the defendants’ wrongful conduct.”84 
Consequently, Bradford, who would realize a profit of only $13,000, was 
nevertheless jointly and severally liable for a draconian judgment of 
$361,186.75.85  
In beginning its analysis, the Sixth Circuit recognized that “[f]ew early 
cases brought under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 dealt with non-disclosure by 
insiders trading in the open market. Development of the law in this area is largely 
traceable to the “abstain or disclose rule” developed in SEC v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur.”86 The Sixth Circuit also recognized that some courts had interpreted 
the “disclose or abstain” rule to require that once the insider traded, the insider 
had an obligation to disclose and a breach of that duty could give rise to a private 
cause of action without any more causation necessary.87 In other words, it was 
the act of trading by the insider that supplied the necessary causation.  
However, the Sixth Circuit did not accept that approach to causation: 
We conclude that upon the facts of this case defendants’ conduct caused no 
injury to plaintiffs and the judgment of the district court must be reversed. It 
is undisputed that defendants did not purchase any shares of stock from 
plaintiffs, and that defendants’ acts of trading in no way affected plaintiffs’ 
decision to sell.88 
In focusing upon causation, the court stated that “[d]efendants’ trading did 
not alter plaintiffs’ expectations when they sold their stock, and in no way 
influenced plaintiffs’ trading decision.”89 Consequently, “defendants’ act of 
trading with third persons was not causally connected with any claimed loss by 
plaintiffs who traded on the impersonal market and who were otherwise 
unaffected by the wrongful acts of the insider.”90  
The logic of the Sixth Circuit is unassailable. Plaintiffs in Fridrich could 
have sold for many reasons: to close out a profit, to generate liquidity to pay for 
college tuition, or to diversify their holdings. The defendant had an obligation 
not to disclose, but this duty ran to the corporation. In fact, absent the law of 
insider trading, the disclosure obligation of either the insider or the corporation 
is limited under securities laws.91 
 
 84. Id. at 313. 
 85. Id. at 308. 
 86. Id. at 314 (footnote omitted). 
 87. Id. at 317. 
 88. Id. at 318. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 318–19. 
 91. Most of the litigation regarding disclosure involves not whether to disclose, but rather, whether the 
disclosure is false or misleading. Charles W. Murdock, The Significance and Impact of Price Distortion in the 
Fraud-on-the-Market Theory After Halliburton II, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 551, 577 (2015). 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a)–(b) 
(2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)–(c) (2012); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
J - MURDOCK_19 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2019 6:40 PM 
August 2019] THE FUTURE OF INSIDER TRADING 1561 
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S 1980S MISADVENTURES IN INSIDER TRADING 
The confusion and uncertainty in the present state of the law on insider 
trading is illustrated by the colloquy at oral argument in the current case of 
Salman v. United States.92 Both sides relied upon Dirks and Chiarella, the two 
poorly reasoned cases that marked the Supreme Court’s turn from conservative 
to reactionary. If the foundation upon which a body of law is based is faulty, 
then the jurisprudence that follows will be equally flawed.  
I now turn to the flawed reasoning embodied in the trilogy of insider 
trading decisions in the early 1980s, including Chiarella,93 Dirks,94 and 
Carpenter,95 which dramatically changed the course of insider trading 
enforcement, led to an explosion in insider trading,96 and triggered the enactment 
of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act in 1984 (ITSA)97 and the Insider Trading 
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act in 1988 (ITSFEA).98 Parenthetically, any 
reference to the Congressional response to the decisions is noticeably absent in 
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. 
A. THE CHIARELLA DECISION—INTRODUCTION OF COMMON LAW DUTY 
As stated above, both the defendant and government in Salman relied upon 
Chiarella and Dirks, thus illustrating that the “rules” set forth in these cases are 
not as clear and logical as supporters have argued.99 Chiarella marked a radical 
departure from existing law, and Dirks made bad law worse. So, let us begin 
with Chiarella. 
Chiarella worked for a financial printer, Pandich Press, and, in the days 
before computers (if anyone can remember that far back), type would be sent 
before the tender offer, with the names of the bidder and target left blank, as well 
as other clearly identifying material.100 The night before the bid was to be made, 
the “blanks” would be filled in and the next morning, the bid would be 
publicized.101 Chiarella was sufficiently astute to discern the identity of the 
target, purchase the target stock at the pre-bid price, and make a substantial profit 
after the stock price rose when the bid was announced.102 
 
 92. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
 93. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
 94. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 95. 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
 96. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 2287 (1983); H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 6044 (1988). 
 97. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified as amended 
in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988)). 
 98. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 99. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 426–29 (2016). 
 100. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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If the purpose of the law was to reward industriousness, as Professor 
Manne has suggested,103 Chiarella certainly was deserving. Unlike the 
defendants in Newman and Salman, Chiarella’s profits came as a result of some 
creative effort on his part.104 Contrariwise, the defendants in Newman and 
Salman were simply leeches, benefiting from the ill-gained knowledge of others. 
However, Chief Justice Burger, a law and order conservative,105 was not 
impressed with Chiarella’s industriousness in his dissenting opinion and 
chastised Chiarella as follows: 
[T]he evidence shows beyond all doubt that Chiarella, working literally in 
the shadows of the warning signs in the printshop, misappropriated—stole to 
put it bluntly—valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost 
confidence. He then exploited his ill-gotten informational advantage by 
purchasing securities in the market. In my view, such conduct plainly 
violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals.106 
Chiarella was tried by the U.S. Attorney essentially for violating the 
“disclose or abstain” duty articulated in Texas Gulf Sulphur. As stated above, 
this formulation by the Texas Gulf Sulphur court has always been problematic 
because, as here, Chiarella was under a duty not to disclose because he clearly 
owed a duty of confidentiality to his employer.  
Moreover, the information he possessed was not “company specific” 
information relating to the “financials” of the bidder to whom he owed a duty of 
confidentiality, but rather “market information,” namely the plan of the bidder 
to make a forthcoming tender offer. Thus, the situation differed from the 
“traditional” insider trading situation where a corporate insider used company 
specific information and, in a “good news” situation, bought from existing 
shareholders to whom he may have had a common law fiduciary duty. Under the 
common law, Chiarella did not have a fiduciary duty to the persons trading on 
the other side of his transactions, namely, the shareholders of the target 
company. 
Dealing with this somewhat unique situation in a point in time when tender 
offers were not as prevalent as today, the majority believed that it could not 
affirm Chiarella’s conviction without recognizing a duty to the market as a 
whole.  
 
 103. Manne, supra note 66, at 935–36. 
 104. Chiarella’s attorney acknowledged the following in closing argument: 
Let me say right up front, too, Mr. Chiarella got on the stand and he conceded, he said candidly, “I 
used clues I got while I was at work. I looked at these various documents and I deciphered them and 
I decoded them and I used that information as a basis for purchasing stock.” There is no question 
about  that. We don’t have to go through a hullabaloo about that. It is something he concedes. There 
is no  mystery about that.  
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 244–45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 105. I am not necessarily a fan of Chief Justice Burger. He fell asleep on me during my oral argument in 
Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985). 
 106. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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This is where the Court ran amuck. As stated earlier,107 the securities laws 
were enacted because the common law was inadequate.108 However, the Court 
now turned to the common law to determine whether there is a violation of the 
federal securities laws. Long ago, a justice who advocated judicial restraint 
nevertheless observed, in discussing disclosure obligations under the securities 
laws, that where federal rights are involved, federal courts can fashion a federal 
common law.109 Unfortunately, the Rehnquist and Roberts courts have rejected 
looking to a federal common law to enforce federal rights on the basis that this 
is judicial activism.110 Paradoxically, these courts themselves have engaged in 
unparalleled judicial activism.111 
The lack of judicial craftsmanship in Chiarella is illustrated by the fact that 
the Court cited Cady, Roberts to support its position that a common law duty 
must be violated before an insider violates Rule 10b-5.112 In fact, Cady, Roberts 
held just the opposite. As stated above, Cady, Roberts was a “bad news” 
situation where the price was likely to go down, so the insider sold. Gintel, the 
colleague of the Curtiss-Wright director who passed the information to him, 
argued that he had no fiduciary duty to those to whom he sold because they were 
non-shareholders.113 The Cady, Roberts opinion made short shrift of this 
argument by stating: 
“Whatever distinctions may have existed at common law . . . that an 
officer or director may stand in a fiduciary relationship to existing 
stockholders from whom he purchases but not to members of the 
public to whom he sells, it is clearly not appropriate to introduce these 
into the broader anti-fraud concepts embodied in the securities 
acts.”114  
Thus, in no way does Cady, Roberts stand for the proposition that the evil in 
insider trading devolves from common law principles. 
Assuming, arguendo, the need to find a duty, Chief Justice Burger would 
find such a duty from the fact that the information was illicitly obtained. Justice 
Burger acknowledged that, in an arm’s-length transaction between two parties, 
the rule is that there is not normally an obligation to disclose. The rationale for 
 
 107. See supra text following note 30. 
 108. See supra text at notes 24–27; see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(discussing that the purpose of the securities laws is “to ensure the fair and honest functioning of impersonal 
national securities markets where common-law protections have proved inadequate”). 
 109. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964) (“[I]t ‘is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion 
federal law where federal rights are concerned.’” (quoting Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 
(1957)). Justice Clark also stated, “Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to 
Commission action.” Id. at 432. 
 110. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576–79 (1979). 
 111. Consider, for example, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), 
where the court, on its own motion, requested the parties to brief a different issue than the parties had brought 
before the court. It then overturned the uniform decisions of the Circuit Courts that defendants could aid and 
abet a violation of Rule 10b-5. Id. at 177–78. 
 112. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227–29. 
 113. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 908–09 (1961). 
 114. Id. at 913–14. 
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this is that a person in a securities transaction should get the benefit of his or her 
“hard work, careful analysis, and astute forecasting.”115 However, the rationale 
for this rule fails “when an informational advantage is obtained, not by superior 
experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful means.”116 Since 
Chiarella did not disclose—indeed, he had a duty not to disclose—he had an 
absolute obligation to abstain and his failure to do so was illegal. 
Recall that Chiarella was a criminal case. The duty in criminal law is not 
to anyone in particular—it is a duty to obey the law which the legislature has 
adopted for the benefit of all. While there may be some who are especially 
benefited by the law, establishment of such a benefit is not a prerequisite to a 
determination that the law has been violated. The prohibition against driving 
through a red light is for the especial benefit of pedestrians and drivers in cross-
traffic. One who was hit by someone who runs a red light can establish 
negligence by showing that the defendant violated the law.117 However, the 
driver who ignores a red light is not exculpated by the fact that he did not hit 
anyone. The statute was violated, and the act is illegal irrespective of whether 
anyone is injured. This is the approach that the majority in Chiarella should have 
taken. Focusing upon whether there is a duty to some particular person or group 
of persons misses the point. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court began its analysis by improperly 
framing the issue. According to the Court, the issue was “whether a person who 
learns from the confidential documents of one corporation that it is planning an 
attempt to secure control of a second corporation violates § 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 if he fails to disclose the impending takeover 
before trading in the target company’s securities.”118  
Based upon the Cady, Roberts decision, which Justice Powell later 
characterized as a “seminal” case in Dirks,119 Justice Powell should have stated 
the issue to be whether a person with material non-public information, which the 
person knows is “intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not 
for the personal benefit of anyone,” violates Rule 10b-5 by trading on the basis 
of that information before it is disclosed to the public.120  
The Court continued its analysis by stating that the “case concerns the legal 
effect of the petitioner’s silence.”121 Again, this misstates the issue. This is not a 
silence case similar to that in the Affiliated Ute case.122 This case does not 
 
 115. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 116. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: STATUTORY VIOLATIONS AS NEGLIGENCE PER SE § 14 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2010). 
 118. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224. 
 119. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 (1983). 
 120. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961).  
 121. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226. 
 122. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). The securities claim arose from the 
mixed-blood members being compelled to deal with the First Security Bank of Utah regarding the sale of their 
shares per agreement with the Ute Development Corporation (UDC). Id. at 145. The mixed-bloods began selling 
their shares through the bank to nonmembers, including two of the bank managers, at prices lower than the price 
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involve Chiarella’s failure to speak, but rather Chiarella’s actions, namely, 
trading on the basis of material, non-public information. Once again, if Cady, 
Roberts is seminal, Cady, Roberts focused not upon silence by Gintel, the tippee, 
but rather, his trading in a situation that involved an unfair advantage because of 
the premature disclosure of material information to him.123 
When you start down the wrong path, it is not surprising that you end up in 
the wrong place. As Yogi Berra once said, “You’ve got to be very careful if you 
don’t know where you are going because you might not get there.”124 
Since Chiarella did not disclose the confidential information before 
trading, the majority allowed itself to be euchred by the faulty language in Texas 
Gulf Sulfur that insiders have an obligation to disclose or abstain. Since he did 
not abstain, under this flawed phraseology, he had a duty to disclose and, since 
he did not disclose, the Court treated the case as a silence case.125  
In so doing, the Court recognized, properly so, that silence is actionable 
only when there is a duty to disclose. But, clearly, Chiarella did not have a duty 
to disclose stemming from his employment relationship. To the contrary, he had 
a duty to maintain confidentiality. The only other relationship that Chiarella had 
was a buyer/seller relationship with the shareholders of the target corporation 
from whom he bought. 
According to the majority, “[p]etitioner’s use of . . . [the forthcoming 
tender offer] was not a fraud under § 10(b) unless he was subject to an 
affirmative duty to disclose it before trading.”126 The Court could see no basis 
upon which posit such a duty: 
Second, the element required to make silence fraudulent—a duty to 
disclose—is absent in this case. No duty could arise from petitioner’s 
relationship with the sellers of the target company’s securities, for petitioner 
had no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was not a 
fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and 
confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers 
only through impersonal market transactions.127 
Consequently, the Court concluded: 
We cannot affirm petitioner’s conviction without recognizing a general duty 
between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on 
 
that the shares were eventually sold for between nonmembers. Id. at 146–47. The mixed-blood members then 
brought suit against the United States, the bank managers, and the bank. Id. at 140. As to the United States, the 
Court found that as federal termination of the shares was complete, the United States had no liability for failure 
to restrain sale. Id. at 150. The Court also found the bank managers committed fraud in that they planned to 
entice the mixed-bloods to sell their shares without disclosing facts that would influence their decision to sell. 
Id. at 153. The Court found that the bank managers were market makers, and had a duty to disclose to the sellers 
that they would benefit from any such sales of shares. Id. The Court lastly found that the Bank was coextensive 
with that of its managers. Id. at 154.  
 123. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 915.  
 124. James Jahnke, Yogi Berra’s 50 Greatest Quotes, DET. FREE PRESS, (Sept. 23, 2015), 
https://www.freep.com/story/sports/mlb/2015/09/23/yogi-berra-quotes-isms/72669094/. 
 125. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226. 
 126. Id. at 231. 
 127. Id. at 232–33. 
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material, nonpublic information. Formulation of such a broad duty, which 
departs radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific 
relationship between two parties . . . should not be undertaken absent some 
explicit evidence of congressional intent.128 
More succinctly: “We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not 
arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information.”129 The Court 
opined that a contrary result “would be inconsistent with the careful plan that 
Congress has enacted for the regulation of the securities markets.”130 
This was a remarkable piece of legerdemain by Justice Powell, an 
experienced corporate lawyer, who was undoubtedly very familiar with the 
securities laws and their history. 
To support the statement that a contrary result would be inconsistent with 
the careful plan that Congress had enacted for the regulation of the securities 
markets, Justice Powell relied upon the Williams Act,131 and the SEC’s 
regulation of “parking.”132 According to the Court, the Williams Act merely 
limits “but does not completely prohibit a tender offeror’s purchases of target 
corporation stock before public announcement of the offer.”133 The Court 
intellectualized from this legislation that Congress does not mind some insider 
trading. What the Court failed to recognize was that the bidder utilized its own 
information, not someone else’s, by purchasing the stock of the target 
corporation. As suggested by the Court, instead of empowering the bidder to do 
something that it otherwise could not do, the Williams Act actually constrains 
the bidder by limiting the time period during which it can use its own 
information to purchase stock. 
Similarly, the argument that using section 14(e) of the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act,134 instead of section 10(b),135 indicates that Rule 10b-5, 
promulgated pursuant to section 10(b), somehow indicates that Congress does 
not believe in parity-of-information is fallacious. This is a non sequitur. The SEC 
promulgated a rule against warehousing and tender offers under section 14(e), 
rather than section 10(b) because, in the first place, section 14 is totally focused 
upon tender offers. In addition, in section 14, Congress explicitly gave the SEC 
the authority not just to define wrongful conduct, as in section 10(b), but also to 
“prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent” fraudulent acts.136 In other 
words, the scope of SEC authority under section 14 is greater than under section 
 
 128. Id. at 233. 
 129. Id. at 235. 
 130. Id.  
 131. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2012). 
 132. United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1290 (2d. Cir. 1991) (“‘Parking’ refers to a transaction in 
which a broker-dealer buys stock from a customer with the understanding that the customer will buy stock back 
at a later date for the purchase price plus interest and commissions.”).  
 133. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233. 
 134. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)–(c) (2012). 
 135. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West 2015). 
 136. Id. § 78n(e) (West 2015). 
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10. In promulgating a rule, it is wise for an administrative body to use its 
broadest legislative authorization. 
Consequently, the fact that the SEC promulgated a rule against 
warehousing and tender offers under section 14, which is focused upon tender 
offers and provides a broad grant of SEC authority, says nothing at all about the 
scope of Rule 10b-5. Unfortunately, Justice Powell, a former corporate lawyer, 
used his broad knowledge of corporate law to muddy the waters by coming up 
with analogies that superficially support his position, but are actually 
irrelevant.137 
The outcome-determinative nature of Justice Powell’s analysis is most 
clearly indicated by its lack of reference to clearly stated congressional policy. 
In recounting the necessity for regulation, Congress explicitly stated in section 
2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that one of the purposes was “to insure 
the maintenance of fair and honest markets” in securities transactions.138 Later, 
in connection with the massive 1975 amendments creating a national market 
system, the joint conference report stated that the “basic goals of the Exchange 
Act remain salutatory and unchallenged,” including the need “to assure that 
dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among 
investors.”139  
While I quarrel with the sophistry utilized by Justice Powell, the U.S. 
Attorney and the Second Circuit were complicit in the focus of the majority on 
whether there was a duty to disclose. The indictment charged that Chiarella 
traded “without disclosing the material nonpublic information he had obtained 
in connection with his employment,”140 and the Second Circuit affirmed the 
conviction by holding that “[a]nyone corporate insider or not who regularly 
receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in 
 
 137. Justice Powell is sometimes thought of as a moderate, but was actually a rabid pro-business 
conservative whose “Manifesto” resulted in the formation of conservative think tanks. In his Memorandum or 
Manifesto, he asserted: 
No thoughtful person can question that the American economic system is under broad 
attack. . . .  
The sources are varied and diffused. They include, not unexpectedly, the Communists, New 
Leftists and other revolutionaries who would destroy the entire system, both political and economic. 
These extremists on the left are far more numerous, better financed, and increasingly are more 
welcomed and encouraged by other elements of society, than ever before in our history. But they 
remain a small minority, and are not yet the principal cause for concern. 
The most disquieting voices joining the chorus of criticism, come from perfectly respectable 
elements of society: from the college campus, the pulpit, the media, the intellectual and literary 
journals, the arts and sciences, and from politicians. 
Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Mr. Eugene B. Synder, Jr., Chairman, Educ. Comm., U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce 1–3 (Aug. 23, 1971) [hereinafter Powell Memorandum] (on file with Washington 
& Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons). 
 138. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78b (West 2015). 
 139. H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91 (1975) (Conf. Rep.). 
 140. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 244 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
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securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose.”141 Thus, both 
bought into the inept phraseology of Texas Gulf Sulfur that the obligation was 
to “disclose or abstain” rather than “abstain until disclosable.” In point of fact, 
the language of the Second Circuit would be compatible with the Cady, Roberts 
rule if the Second Circuit had simply deleted the phrase “without incurring an 
affirmative duty to disclose” in the above sentence. 
The foregoing illustrates the soundness of my assertion that the Texas Gulf 
Sulfur court created unnecessary mischief when it articulated the mantra 
“disclose or abstain” instead of more accurately articulating a standard of 
“abstain until disclosable.” 
Had the mantra been “abstain until disclosable,” the Supreme Court would 
not have had the opportunity to wax eloquently on its inability to find a basis for 
any duty of Chiarella to disclose the confidential information to target 
shareholders—an absurd issue in the first place since Chiarella clearly had a duty 
not to disclose to anyone pursuant to his employment. 
The ineptness of the “disclose or abstain” standard does not, however, let 
the Supreme Court off the hook for the distraction it created by focusing upon 
the absurd proposition that it needed to find a common law duty that Chiarella 
owed to target shareholders in order to convict him under federal law. In effect, 
Justice Powell engaged in a masterful distraction to introduce uncertainty and 
ambiguity into the law of insider trading. 
According to Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, the jury was told: 
[In] simple terms, the charge is that Chiarella wrongfully took advantage of 
information he acquired in the course of his confidential position at Pandick 
Press and secretly used that information when he knew other people trading 
in the securities market did not have access to the same information that he 
had at a time when he knew that that information was material to the value 
of the stock.142 
This charge clearly fits within the “seminal” Cady, Roberts standard that 
Chiarella knowingly took information that was intended only for corporate 
purposes and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and used it unfairly, 
realizing that his knowledge was not available to others who traded in the 
market. This formulation of the fraud was also consistent with the congressional 
policy that the purpose of the securities laws was to “assure that dealing in 
securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among 
investors.”143 
Instead of dealing with existing law and revising the Texas Gulf Sulfur 
standard to “abstain until disclosable,” Justice Powell, who authored the famous 
“Powell Memorandum”144 challenging “liberal” positions such as auto safety, 
subtly and cleverly took the law of insider trading in a new and restrictive 
 
 141. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978) (emphasis added). 
 142. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 243–44 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in original). 
 143. H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91. 
 144. Powell Memorandum, supra note 137.  
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direction. Justice Powell also began to undercut the notion of fairness that was 
inherent in the securities laws, stating that “not every instance of financial 
unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10 (b).”145 He continued his 
campaign against “fairness” in the subsequent insider trading opinion in 
Dirks.146 
The majority opinion declined to address the misappropriation theory 
articulated by Chief Justice Burger,147 and again avoided it in the Carpenter 
case. Nevertheless, while Justice Burger lost the battle, he ultimately won the 
war when the Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation theory in 
O’Hagan.148 
B. THE DIRKS DECISION—TIPPEE DOESN’T SIN UNLESS TIPPER SINS 
If Chiarella was bad, Dirks was worse, both on the facts and the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence. Reading the majority and dissenting opinions is like 
watching two dramatically different movies: one involves a hero and the other a 
desperado.149 
Dirks involved an unbelievable set of facts. Equity Funding was an 
insurance company that wanted to enhance its earnings.150 Since an insufficient 
number of real persons purchased its policies, it began creating people and, since 
the insurance business involves both inflows (customers paying premiums) and 
outflows (customers dying and beneficiaries collecting on the policies), Equity 
Funding also needed to kill some people.151 Fortunately, the company only killed 
some of the fictitious people that it had created.152 
Secrist, an unhappy former executive of Equity Funding, informed Dirks, 
an analyst, of the scam and asked Dirks to publicize the fraud.153 While Dirks 
 
 145. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232. 
 146. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653–54 (1983). 
 147. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Arguably, a majority of the Justices in Chiarella 
accepted the misappropriation theory: the three dissenters, Justice Brennan concurring with the judgment, and 
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion. 
 148. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997).  
 149. The opinion describes Dirks’ investigation in the Los Angeles Equity Funding office as innocent, 
stating that “[n]either Dirks nor his firm owned or traded . . . stock,” but instead, he “openly discussed the 
information” resulting in some clients and investors selling their holdings. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649. The Court 
also favorably frames Dirks’ involvement in describing the SEC decision: “[r]recognizing, however, that Dirks 
‘played an important role in bringing [Equity Funding’s] massive fraud to light’ . . . the SEC only censured him.” 
Id. at 651–52 (second alteration in original) (citing Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17480, 1981 
WL 36329 (Jan. 22, 1981)). The dissent, however, describes Dirks’ investigation differently, stating: “Instead 
of reporting that information to the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . Dirks began to disseminate the 
information to his clients,” and “[a]s he gathered more information, he selectively disclosed it to his clients.” Id. 
at 669–70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent also states that “Dirks’ attempts to disseminate the information 
to nonclients were feeble, at best.” Id. at 670 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The effect of this, the dissent states, 
was that “Dirks’ clients were able to shift the losses that were inevitable.” Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 150. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649.  
 151. Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17480, 1981 WL 36329, at *2 (Jan. 22, 1981).   
 152. Id.  
 153. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649–50. 
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took some steps to publicize the fraud,154 he also told a number of clients and 
institutional investors, of which five of the latter liquidated holdings in Equity 
Funding worth $16 million.155 As a result of the increased trading and drop in 
price, the New York Stock Exchange suspended trading, the SEC filed a 
complaint, and Equity Funding officers and directors were indicted.156 
The majority began its analysis by interpreting Chiarella as requiring a 
breach of common law fiduciary duty, or duty of confidentiality, as a 
prerequisite to finding fraudulent activity in insider trading.157 The Court 
asserted that it would not “recogniz[e] a general duty between all participants in 
market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic 
information.”158 As will be developed later, the Supreme Court’s horror in 
recognizing such a duty is undercut when one recognizes that a defendant’s 
conduct is illegal only when it can be established that the defendant has the 
requisite state of mind, or scienter. 
The Court then stated that there are “analytical difficulties” in “policing 
tippees who trade on inside information,”159 and that it is “unclear how a tippee 
acquires the Cady, Roberts duty to refrain from trading on inside 
information.”160 Perhaps the Court would have found it helpful to have read the 
Cady, Roberts decision since a tippee, trading on inside information, was exactly 
the subject matter of the opinion. That the Supreme Court can acknowledge that 
Cady, Roberts is a seminal opinion, but not understand the case, is mind-
boggling. Instead of clarifying existing law, the Dirks opinion muddled it. 
Cady, Roberts was clear: “those persons who are in a special relationship 
with a company and privy to its internal affairs . . . thereby suffer correlative 
duties in trading in its securities.”161 With regard to tippees, their liability arises 
from “a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended 
 
 154. Dirks attempted to contact The Wall Street Journal to publicize the fraud on March 12, and succeeded 
on March 19 when he was told by Herbert Lawson, the bureau chief, that Lawson would refer the matter to a 
Journal reporter based in Los Angeles where Equity Funding was located. Id. at 670. Dirks later met with 
William Blundell, the Journal’s Los Angeles bureau chief on March 21. Id. Blundell indicated he would pursue 
his own inquiry but did appear skeptical. Id.  
 155. Id. at 649. See SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 58 (1st Cir. 1983) (“In an SEC enforcement action, a 
court can legitimately seek to ‘disgorge ill-gotten gains or to restore the status quo, or to accomplish both 
objectives.’” (quoting SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec. Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 95, 102 (2d Cir. 1978)); see also 
SEC v. Yun, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (ordering defendants to disgorge the profits of their 
insider trading scheme); SEC v. Druffner, 517 F. Supp. 2d 502, 512 (D. Mass. 2007) (requiring defendant to 
disgorge profits in the amount of $732,281); SEC v. Happ, 295 F. Supp. 2d 189, 198 (D. Mass. 2003) (ruling 
that disgorgement of the loss avoided is appropriate); SEC v. Ingoldsby, SEC Memorandum and Order, Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 95,351 (May 15, 1990) (ordering that defendant disgorge profits of $24,663); SEC v. 
Smith, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 98,564 (2015) (ordering defendant to disgorge profits of $43,342.88).  
 156. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 650. 
 157. Id. at 654–655. 
 158. Id. at 655 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 455 U.S. 222, 232–23 (1980) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). 
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to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of 
anyone.”162 Violations require scienter, which means that the defendant knew, 
or was reckless in not knowing, that the “information [was] intended to be 
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of 
anyone.” 163 Once this test is met, Cady, Roberts would find the defendant to be 
culpable, irrespective of whether the tipper received a benefit or breached any 
fiduciary duty—recall that the tipper in Cady, Roberts did not sin, because the 
tipper neither breached a fiduciary duty nor received any benefit.164 
Having created a problem where one theretofore did not exist, the majority 
set forth to solve it. The SEC’s position in Dirks was simple—the tippee 
inherited the insider’s duty: 
In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty which he had assumed as 
a result of knowingly receiving confidential information from [Equity 
Funding] insiders. Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public, material 
information from insiders become ‘subject to the same duty as [the] insiders.’ 
Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary duty which he assumes from the insider 
when the tippee knowingly transmits the information to someone who will 
probably trade on the basis thereof.… Presumably, Dirks’ informants were 
entitled to disclose the [Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and 
its perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks—standing in their shoes—
committed a breach of the fiduciary duty which he had assumed in dealing 
with them, when he passed the information on to traders.165  
But, according to the majority, Chiarella determined that “there can be no 
duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside information ‘was not 
[the corporation’s] agent . . . was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom 
the sellers [of the securities] had placed their trust and confidence.’”166 
Justice Powell referenced the Cady, Roberts duty numerous times, but was 
oblivious to what Cady, Roberts actually held. For example: 
Thus, some tippees must assume an insider’s duty to the shareholders not 
because they receive inside information, but rather because it has been made 
available to them improperly. And for Rule 10b–5 purposes, the insider’s 
disclosure is improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts duty. 
Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation 
not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has 
breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information 
to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a 
breach.167 
In fact, Cady, Roberts held just the opposite. As stated above, Cady, 
Roberts was a “bad news” situation where the price is likely to decrease, so the 
insider sells to persons to whom he arguably does not have a common law 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 36–38. 
 165. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655–56 (citing 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1410 n.42) (citations omitted). 
 166. Id. at 654 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980)). 
 167. Id. at 660. 
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fiduciary duty.168 The defendant was not a traditional corporate insider and was 
not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. In 
addition, the tipper breached no fiduciary duty and received no benefit. 
Having rejected the SEC view that “the antifraud provisions require equal 
information among all traders,”169 the Court interpreted Chiarella as setting 
forth that “only some persons, under some circumstances, will be barred from 
trading while in possession of material nonpublic information.”170 The Court 
considered the duty to “disclose-or-refrain” to be “extraordinary,”171 and 
reaffirmed its view of Chiarella as holding “[a] duty [to disclose] arises from 
the relationship between parties . . . and not merely from one’s ability to acquire 
information because of his position in the market.”172 
Since only some persons under some circumstances are prohibited from 
using inside information and since the duty to disclose or refrain is 
extraordinary, one would draw the conclusion that insider trading is the 
exception and not the rule. In such a case, it would not be unlikely that there 
would be an explosion in insider trading following these decisions, but that is 
exactly what happened.173 
At this point in the decision, we know that a tippee’s duty is derivative, and 
that a tippee is liable only when the tipper has “sinned,” or breached a fiduciary 
duty. Once again, the majority opinion manifested its concern for analysts. 
According to the Court, a legitimate use of inside information occurs when 
management conveys information to analysts: 
In some situations, the insider will act consistently with his fiduciary duty to 
shareholders, and yet release of the information may affect the market. For 
example, it may not be clear—either to the corporate insider or to the 
recipient analyst—whether the information will be viewed as material 
nonpublic information. Corporate officials may mistakenly think the 
information already has been disclosed or that it is not material enough to 
affect the market.174 
Justice Powell resolved this dilemma by asserting: “[w]hether disclosure is 
a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on the purpose of the 
disclosure.”175 In so doing, he once again inadvertently misinterpreted Cady, 
Roberts. According to Justice Powell, “[t]his standard was identified by the SEC 
itself in Cady, Roberts: a purpose of the securities laws was to eliminate the ‘use 
of inside information for personal advantage.’”176 But the culprit who received 
a benefit in Cady, Roberts was not the tipper, but rather the tippee. 
 
 168. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 908 (1961). 
 169. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657.  
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 657–58 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231–32, n.14 (1980)) (alterations in 
original). 
 173. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 2287 (1983); H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 6044 (1988). 
 174. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. (quoting Cady, Roberts, & Co. 40 S.E.C. 907, 912, n. 15 (1961)). 
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The Court put the pieces of the picture together as follows: “Thus, the test 
is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his 
disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to 
stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative 
breach.”177 
According to the Court, this will introduce objectivity, as opposed to 
subjectivity, into the analysis: “This requires courts to focus on objective 
criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit 
from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will 
translate into future earnings.”178  
The Court loosened this objective criteria by acknowledging the possibility 
that the insider might recognize a benefit by making a gift of the information. 
This addition was germane to and in fact, dispositive of, the Salman decision: 
“The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also 
exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading 
relative or friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself 
followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”179 
Having thus formulated the law of the case, resolution was simple: 
The tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity 
Funding’s secrets, nor was their purpose to make a gift of valuable 
information to Dirks. As the facts of this case clearly indicate, the tippers 
were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud. In the absence of a breach of 
duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was no derivative breach by 
Dirks.180 
Even here, the Supreme Court’s approach was simplistic and outcome-
determinative. In the view of the majority, the tipper and tippee were heroes—
they sought to expose a fraud. The dissent took a much more jaundiced view of 
the situation: “In disclosing that information to Dirks, Secrist intended that Dirks 
would disseminate the information to his clients, those clients would unload their 
Equity Funding securities on the market, and the price would fall precipitously, 
thereby triggering a reaction from the authorities.”181 
There were no heroes in the dissenters’ view, only winners and losers: 
Dirks’ clients gained and the public lost. As the dissent pointed out: 
By that time [when the SEC finally suspended trading], Dirks’ clients had 
unloaded close to $15 million of Equity Funding stock and the price had 
plummeted from $26 to $15. The effect of Dirks’ selective dissemination of 
Secrist’s information was that Dirks’ clients were able to shift the losses that 
 
 177. Id.  
 178. Id. at 663. The court did recognize that “[d]etermining whether an insider personally benefits from a 
particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be easy for courts. But it is essential, we think, to have 
a guiding principle for those whose daily activities must be limited and instructed by the SEC’s inside-trading 
rules.” Id. at 664.  
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. at 667 (citation omitted). 
 181. Id. at 669 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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were inevitable due to the Equity Funding fraud from themselves to 
uninformed market participants.182 
The dissent also rejected the notion that Dirks acted altruistically: 
The Court’s implicit suggestion that Dirks did not gain by this selective 
dissemination of advice is inaccurate. The ALJ found that because of Dirks’ 
information, Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., directed business 
to Delafield Childs that generated approximately $25,000 in commissions. 
App. 199, 204–205. While it is true that the exact economic benefit gained 
by Delafield Childs due to Dirks’ activities is unknowable because of the 
structure of compensation in the securities market, there can be no doubt that 
Delafield and Dirks gained both monetary rewards and enhanced reputations 
for “looking after” their clients.183 
The dissent would not accept the premise that “the end justified the means.”184 
The SEC also took a dim view of the majority’s approach, asserting that 
“if inside-trading liability does not exist when the information is transmitted for 
a proper purpose but is used for trading, it would be a rare situation when the 
parties could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate business justification for 
transmitting the information.”185 The majority disagreed, stating “[w]e think the 
SEC is unduly concerned.”186 History has proved the SEC correct. As this 
Article will demonstrate, it is very difficult to obtain a conviction if the tipper 
and tippee concoct a story and stick to it.187 
For the dissent, the fallacy in the majority’s approach was that it 
“engraft[ed] a special motivational requirement on the fiduciary duty doctrine,” 
which “excuses a knowing and intentional violation of an insider’s duty to 
shareholders if the insider does not act from a motive of personal gain.”188 
According to the dissent: 
The fact that the insider himself does not benefit from the breach does not 
eradicate the shareholder’s injury. It makes no difference to the shareholder 
whether the corporate insider gained or intended to gain personally from the 
transaction; the shareholder still has lost because of the insider’s misuse of 
nonpublic information. The duty is addressed not to the insider’s motives, 
but to his actions and their consequences on the shareholder. Personal gain 
is not an element of the breach of this duty.189  
A major problem in the majority’s analysis was that, while asserting that 
only some insider trading was wrongful, it provided us with very little insight as 
to what is a legitimate use of inside information. The Court appeared to have no 
problem with insiders making selective disclosure to analysts: 
 
 182. Id. at 670 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 183. Id. at 669 n.4 (citations omitted) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 184. Id. at 677 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
 185. Id. at 663.   
 186. Id.  
 187. See SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 762 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (describing a situation where the tipper 
and tippee concocted a story that the tippee, while laying on a bench at a track meet, overheard the tipper and 
his wife, several feet away, discussing a forthcoming trip due to a recapitalization).  
 188. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 668 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 189. Id. at 673–74 (Blackman, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
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Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly 
receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it 
could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the 
SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. It 
is commonplace for analysts to “ferret out and analyze information,” and this 
often is done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others 
who are insiders.190  
Once again, Justice Powell’s analysis was sloppy. From reading the 
foregoing, one would gather the impression that the SEC was fearful that holding 
Dirks liable would inhibit the legitimate work of analysts. In fact, the decision 
of the SEC was to the contrary. Here is how the SEC viewed the role of analysts: 
In this connection, it is important to recognize that this [Dirks] is not a case 
in which a skilled analyst weaves together a series of publicly available facts 
and non-material inside disclosures to form a “mosaic” which is only 
material after the bits and pieces are assembled into one picture. We have 
long recognized that an analyst may utilize non-public, inside information 
which in itself is immaterial in order to fill in “interstices in analysis.” That 
process is legitimate even though such “tidbits” of inside information “may 
assume heightened significance when woven by the skilled analyst into the 
matrix of knowledge obtained elsewhere,” thereby creating material 
information. But this is not such a case. Secrist’s information certainly was 
not “seemingly inconsequential data.” Instead, its significance was 
immediately clear. Upon receipt of the information from Secrist, there was 
no need for Dirks to obtain, and he did not obtain, significant new facts to be 
woven together with Secrist’s original allegations. All that occurred was 
corroboration and confirmation from inside sources of the original 
allegations. Under these circumstances, our decision here will not discourage 
analysts from engaging in the legitimate and desirable function of seeking 
out corporate information.191 
Justice Powell’s bias in favor of the business community, as opposed to the 
interests of individual shareholders, would be apparent to anyone who has read 
the Powell Memorandum, in which he saw a “massive assault upon [the business 
community’s] fundamental economics, upon its philosophy, upon its right to 
continue to manage its own affairs, and indeed upon its integrity . . . .”192 He saw 
this attack as essentially led by the left and those who advocated for the 
regulatory state. No wonder Justice Powell was more sympathetic to the world 
of analysts than to the viewpoint of the SEC. Justice Powell’s approach benefits 
corrupt traders, who make millions of dollars from illicitly obtained information, 
as illustrated by the facts in Newman.193 
 To the extent that Justice Powell’s viewpoint had any validity, it has been 
undercut by two subsequent developments. In 2000, the SEC adopted Regulation 
FD, which required that, when a corporation discloses material nonpublic 
information, particularly to market professionals such as analysts, it makes a 
 
 190.  Id. at 658 (citation omitted).  
 191. Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17480, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1409 (Jan. 22, 1981) 
(opinion of the commission) (citations omitted).  
 192. Powell Memorandum, supra note 137, at 7. 
 193. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443, 447–48 (2d Cir. 2014).  
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public disclosure either immediately, in the case of an intentional disclosure, and 
promptly, in the case of an inadvertent disclosure. 194 
 In addition, about this time, during the dot-com bubble, the analyst 
community grossly embarrassed itself by publicly touting stocks which it 
privately disparaged as “junk,” “crap,” and a “powder keg.”195 Ten investment 
banking firms and two analysts paid 1.4 billion dollars in fines, restitution, and 
other payments.196 
Similarly, the following assertion by Justice Powell was never accurate: “It 
is the nature of this type of information, and indeed of the markets themselves, 
that such information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the 
corporation’s stockholders or the public generally.”197  
Recall that in Cady, Roberts, the company instructed a secretary to notify 
the exchanges and Dow Jones about the dividend cut.198 In today’s world, such 
an assertion is all the more fallacious. Regulation FD requires disclosure of 
material nonpublic information and there are many ways in which disclosure can 
be made. Companies are mandated to file quarterly reports setting forth financial 
information;199 in the interim, current reports can be filed;200 and companies 
have websites and frequently set up investor conference calls.201 On top of this, 
it is still possible to notify the stock exchanges, NASDAQ, and Dow Jones. 
The lack of respect by the majority for the notion of parity of information 
is at odds with the frequently repeated Congressional policy that the playing field 
should be level and that no investor should have any undue advantage.202 
Congress itself has stated that, if Dirks is “properly and narrowly construed by 
the courts, the Commission’s insider trading program will not be adversely 
affected.”203 
C. THE CARPENTER CASE—CONFUSION OVER “IN CONNECTION WITH.” 
Carpenter v. United States, the third of the 1980s trilogy of insider trading 
cases, involved a unique scam to make profits by trading stocks.204 David 
Carpenter and R. Foster Winans, one of the writers of the “Heard on the Street,” 
a widely-read financial column at that time in The Wall Street Journal, were 
 
 194. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2012). 
 195.  Top 10 Regrettable Emails, Pumping and Dumping, TIME http://content.time.com/time/specials/ 
packages/article/0,28804,1907771_1907778_1907820,00.html (last visited July 27, 2019). 
 196. Stephen Labaton, Wall Street Settlement: The Overview; 10 Wall St. Firms Reach Settlement in Analyst 
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/29/business/wall-street-settlement-
overview-10-wall-st-firms-reach-settlement-analyst.html.  
 197. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983). 
 198. See supra text accompanying notes 36–39. 
 199. 17 CFR §§ 240.13a-1; 240.13a-13 (2018). 
 200. 17 CFR § 240.13a-11. 
 201. Brian Beers, What is an Earnings Conference Call?, INVESTOPEDIA, (May 31, 2018), 
http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/04/052104.asp. 
 202. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.  
 203. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 15 (1983). 
 204. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). 
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roommates.205 Peter Brant, one of the leading brokers at the Kidder, Peabody 
brokerage house, had noticed that the stock of companies discussed by Winans 
would “move” after his column was published—up when the column was 
positive, and down when it was negative.206 Brant approached Winans about 
leaking the content of the columns before publication.207 Brant would buy a 
company’s stock when Winans was about to write a positive column about the 
company and would sell short when Winans was about to write a negative 
column on a company.208 After the column was published and the stock moved, 
Brandt would close out the transaction.209 Over a four-month period, the scheme 
netted almost $700,000.210 
After the scheme was uncovered, Brant cooperated, while Winans and 
Carpenter were convicted both of wire fraud and a violation of Rule 10b-5 
predicated upon the misappropriation theory.211 The Supreme Court affirmed the 
wire fraud conviction but split 4-4 on the Rule 10b-5 count.212 
What undoubtedly troubled some members of the Court was the fact that 
the Rule 10b-5 conviction was predicated upon the schemers misappropriating 
the publication schedule of The Wall Street Journal. For some this raised a 
problem as to whether the fraud was “in connection with” a purchase or sale of 
a security.213 
This case, like Chiarella, involved, not a corporate insider misusing 
company-specific information for his own benefit, but rather “market” 
information used by market professionals for their own advantage. It also 
illustrates the tenuous premise of the misappropriation theory in which a fraud 
in one area, misappropriating one person’s information, is used to engage in a 
stock transaction with entirely different persons.  
Winans engaged in this scheme because he did not believe that The Wall 
Street Journal adequately compensated him for the exposure his column gave 
the Journal. But what if his superiors at the Journal suggested that, in lieu of 
giving him a salary raise, he should simply trade stocks based upon his column’s 
impact? Now there is no misappropriation of the Journal’s printing schedule; 
rather, he has been given permission to access it for his benefit. 
Thus, this Article argues that it would be more straightforward to recognize 
the so-called “possession” theory and require market professionals not to use 
material, nonpublic information for their own benefit prior to dissemination to 
the public. 
 
 205. Id. at 22. 
 206. Id. at 23. 
 207. Id.  
 208. Id.  
 209. Id.  
 210. Id.  
 211. See id. at 24. In addition, arguably, and to retaliate, Winans published a book, Trading Secrets, which 
detailed Brant’s role in the scheme, and painted Brandt in a very unfavorable light. 
 212. Id.  
 213. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 667 (1997). 
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It was ten more years before the Supreme Court recognized the 
misappropriation theory and determined that the “in connection with” 
requirement was satisfied because the purpose of misappropriating information 
was to engage in a securities transaction.214 Thus, the Carpenter case is 
noteworthy for what it did not do, rather than for the insights it provided.215  
III. THE AFTERMATH OF CHIARELLA AND DIRKS 
The 1980s witnessed an explosion of insider trading. This is recounted in 
the well-documented book, Den of Thieves,216 as well as in the committee reports 
to the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984,217 and the Insider Trading 
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.218 While correlation does not 
necessarily mean causation, the message from the Supreme Court was clear: 
only some insider trading in some circumstances is unlawful, and the duty to 
“disclose or abstain” is extraordinary. It would be naïve to assume that such a 
judicial philosophy would not embolden investors who are greedy and also risk-
averse. The SEC’s warning that “it would be a rare situation when the parties 
could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate business justification for 
transmitting the information”219 more than played out in subsequent cases. In 
fact, what developed was not the fabrication of business justification, but rather 
pure fabrication.220 The reality is that conviction for insider trading is difficult if 
the tipper and tippee concoct a false story and stick to it.221 
 
 
 214. See generally id. 
 215. The House of Representatives recognized in a report: 
“The Court divided on a 4–4 vote on the question of whether Winans’ ‘misappropriation’ of 
information rightfully belonging to his employer constituted insider trading, even absent any direct 
fiduciary duty owned from Winans to the issuers or purchasers and sellers of the securities. The 
Court’s opinion contained no discussion of the issue. Thus the misappropriation theory clearly 
remains valid in the Second Circuit, the lower Court in the Winans case, but is unresolved nationally. 
In the view of the Committee, however, this type of security fraud should be encompassed within 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”  
H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 10 (1988). 
 216. STEWART, supra note 10. 
 217. Insider Trading Sanction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1998)). 
 218. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act Of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 
(1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 219. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983). 
 220. See, e.g., SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984). 
 221. On the other hand, if the tipper and tippee tell the truth instead of fabricating a story, they will be 
convicted of insider trading. For example, in SEC v. Yun, 327 F. 3d 1263 (2003), a real estate agent walked into 
the office as another agent was talking to her husband about the reason for the low valuation of stock in their 
post-nuptial agreement. Id. at 1268. That evening, at a dinner, they further discussed the matter and the wife 
apparently confirmed the information, and the other realtor traded on it. Id. If they had lied about discussing the 
matter together and agreed that the first realtor had just overheard a telephone conversation, the charge of insider 
trading most likely would not have been successful because there was no conscious transmission of information 
to the trading realtor. See supra notes 191-196 and accompanying text. The law is in a sad state when it 
encourages lying. 
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A. CASES ILLUSTRATING THE BENEFITS OF LYING AND THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF TELLING THE TRUTH  
Shortly after the Chiarella and Dirks decisions, two cases illustrated the 
SEC’s concern about fabrication. In SEC v. Switzer,222 a famous football coach 
attended his son’s track meet and had several conversations with a corporate 
executive who was a sponsor of Switzer’s football television program. 
According to the testimony: 
Sometime in the afternoon, after his last conversation with G. Platt, Switzer 
laid down on a row of bleachers behind the Platts to sunbathe while waiting 
for his son’s next event. While Switzer was sunbathing, he overheard G. Platt 
talking to his wife about his trip to New York the prior day. In that 
conversation, G. Platt mentioned Morgan Stanley and his desire to dispose 
of or liquidate Phoenix. G. Platt further talked about several companies 
bidding on Phoenix. Switzer also overheard that an announcement of a 
“possible” liquidation of Phoenix might occur the following Thursday. 
Switzer remained on the bleachers behind the Platts for approximately 
twenty minutes then got up and continued to move about.223 
How plausible is this story? In an outdoor stadium, have you ever tried to listen 
to a conversation between two people a few feet away? 
So what did Switzer do? That weekend, he initiated conversations with 
three groups of investors.224 The first group purchased 6000 shares for about 
$260,000 and sold a few days later for a profit of $118,587.225 A second group 
put up the capital to purchase 16,500 shares for a total investment of about 
$700,000; the stock was sold a few days later for a profit of $267,728, of which 
$110,491 was paid to Switzer and his buddy who introduced him to the group.226 
A third group purchased 13,000 shares for a total investment of about $575,000, 
making a profit of $205,055, of which $85,310 was paid to Switzer and his 
buddy.227 
How likely would it be that a group of investors would invest these sums 
of money and split the profits with the tipper, who supposedly overheard an 
unnamed executive talking to his wife at a track meet while the tipper lay on the 
bleachers a few feet away?228 
 
 222. 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984). 
 223. Id. at 762. 
 224. Id. at 762–63. 
 225. Id. at 759. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. In 1987, I put on a program for the Continuing Legal Education Satellite Network on “Insider Trading: 
Definitions, Enforcement, Defense and Avoidance,” with a balanced panel from the SEC and private industry. 
In connection with the program, I used actors to create a vignette depicting the supposed facts in the Switzer 
case. After watching the vignette, the general consensus was that Switzer’s story was inherently implausible. 
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These dollar amounts may not seem impressive in today’s world where 
insiders are raking in millions of dollars, but, in the 1980s, they were quite 
significant. You could calculate a factor of about four to get the equivalent value 
in today’s dollars. 
In a highly publicized case at the time,229 United States v. Reed,230 Thomas 
Reed, a former secretary of the Air Force, purchased 500 out of the money call 
options on Amax for $3000, enabling him to buy Amax stock at $50 per share.231 
The stock was then trading at $38; consequently, the options were “out of the 
money” and thus very inexpensive.232 Prior to his purchase, he had several 
telephone conversations with his father, a director of Amax, who was out of 
town.233 The next day, Amax announced that it had rejected a buyout offer from 
Chevron, and the price of its stock soared.234 Reed then sold his options for 
$430,000.235 While his father knew of the offer from Chevron, Reed and his 
father testified that they did not discuss it in their telephone conversations.236 
But why else would someone buy out of the money call options that were soon 
to expire? 
Fast-forward to more current times and the case of SEC v. Yun,237 in which 
the defendants did not fabricate a story, but apparently told the truth. Donna Yun 
was entering into a postnuptial division of assets with her husband, the president 
of a subsidiary of Scholastic Corporation.238 Her husband had informed her that 
the earnings of scholastic would be substantially down and that is why he had 
entered a low valuation.239 While she was discussing this matter on the telephone 
with her attorney, a fellow realtor, Jerry Burch, entered the office and overheard 
the conversation.240 He later testified that he did not learn enough from 
overhearing the conversation to make a decision to trade the Scholastic stock.241  
However, he and Donna went to a cocktail party that evening and discussed 
the conversation.242 The following day, he purchased $19,750 in Scholastic put 
options and, a day later, Scholastic announced that its earnings would be well 
 
Charles W. Murdock, Insider Trading: Definitions, Enforcement, Defense and Avoidance, Program at the 
JCPenney Conference Ctr., New York City (June 3, 1987). 
 229. Jury Clears Reed in Amax Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 1985), https://nyti.ms/29DtYYL. 
 230. 601 F. Supp 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). While Reed was indicted, the jury apparently believed the testimony 
of the father and son. Reed, however, resigned as an advisor to President Reagan when this transaction became 
public. 
 231. Id. at 690–91. 
 232. Id. at 691. 
 233. Id. at 690. 
 234. Id. at 691. 
 235. Id.  
 236. Id. at 688–93. 
 237. 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 238. Id. at 1267. 
 239. Id.  
 240. Id. at 1268. 
 241. Id.  
 242. Id.  
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below the analysts’ expectations.243 The next day, the price of Scholastic shares 
had dropped approximately forty percent, and he sold his Scholastic puts, 
realizing a profit of $269,000, a 1300 percent return on his investment.244 Within 
hours, the SEC commenced an investigation.245 
 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the SEC, but the Eleventh Circuit 
reversed on the basis that the jury instructions did not require that Donna receive 
a benefit from sharing information with Burch.246 The Eleventh Circuit did 
recognize that a jury could reasonably conclude that “Donna expected to benefit 
from her tip to Burch by maintaining a good relationship between a friend and 
frequent partner in real estate deals.”247 The Eleventh Circuit also recognized 
that a confidential relationship existed between husband and wife: 
We conclude that the SEC provided sufficient evidence both that an 
agreement of confidentiality and a history or pattern of sharing and keeping 
of business confidences existed between David and Donna Yun such that 
David could have reasonably expected Donna to keep confidential what he 
told her about Scholastic’s pending announcement.248  
This latter position is in sharp contradistinction to the Second Circuit’s 
position in United States v. Chestman, where the Second Circuit held that a 
confidential relationship did not exist between husband and wife: 
Keith’s status as Susan’s husband could not itself establish fiduciary status. 
Nor, absent a pre-existing fiduciary relation or an express agreement of 
confidentiality, could the coda—“Don’t tell.” That leaves the unremarkable 
testimony that Keith and Susan had shared and maintained generic 
confidences before. The jury was not told the nature of these past disclosures 
and therefore it could not reasonably find a relationship that inspired 
fiduciary, rather than normal marital, obligations.249 
The Second Circuit’s view of the marriage relationship is certainly not one 
that I hold, nor is it, I suspect, one with which most people would agree. How 
does the Second Circuit explain the marital privilege that one spouse need not 
testify against another? Subsequent to Chestman, the SEC promulgated a rule 
which set forth a presumption that there is a relationship of confidentiality 
between spouses and certain other family members.250  
For the sake of argument, assume that Donna and Burch agreed that Burch 
made his decision based upon overhearing Donna’s phone call with her attorney 
and that the subject was never discussed at the subsequent cocktail party. Would 
an SEC judgment then have been possible? The husband did not breach any duty 
of confidentiality or fiduciary duty by telling his wife about relevant information 
 
 243. Id.  
 244. Id.  
 245. Id.  
 246. Id. at 1281. 
 247. Id. at 1280. 
 248. Id. at 1273–74. 
 249. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 571 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 250. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2003). 
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concerning their postnuptial division of assets. Nor did Donna breach any duty 
of confidentiality or fiduciary duty by discussing the matter with her attorney. 
Had Burch merely overheard the privileged conversation, Donna would not have 
sinned, and thus Burch could not have sinned. Moreover, Donna did not 
communicate the information to Burch with the expectation of a benefit—she 
did not intentionally communicate the information at all. 
In securities transactions, there are winners and losers. Why should greedy, 
risk-averse investors be entitled to keep their ill-gotten gains? Is this something 
that the law should facilitate? But that is exactly what the tortured opinions in 
Chiarella and Dirks accomplish. Why should the existence of a benefit, or lack 
thereof, determine whether or not the tippee retains the benefit from trading in 
an essentially riskless transaction? 
B. THE ANALYSTS’ DOT-COM FRAUDULENT SCHEME 
Fast-forward ten years to the late 1990s and the emergence of a slew of 
Internet-based startup companies that ultimately led to the bursting of the so-
called dot-com bubble.251 Reading between the lines in the Dirks opinion, one 
could conclude that Justice Powell’s goal was not to endanger the analyst 
industry by exposing it to insider trading liability.252 Contrariwise, Congress did 
not believe that enforcement of insider trading law would discourage legitimate 
analyst activity.253 
However, at this time, the analyst industry brought itself into disrepute. 
Analysts were touting high-tech companies with little or no earnings, while at 
the same time, privately disparaging the stock of such companies as “junk,” 
“crap,” and “a disaster.”254 Nevertheless, the analysts promulgated “buy” ratings 
on such companies to help their employers gain business.  
The conflict of interest that infected the recommendations of analysts is 
illustrated by the history of Interliant, Inc. Interliant was touted by Henry 
Blodgett, the star analyst for Merrill Lynch. When Merrill Lynch initiated 
coverage on August 4, 1999, the company stock was trading at $16.375, rose to 
a high of $55.50, and plummeted to $4.00 as of February 21, 2001.255 
“Throughout this period, Merrill’s investment-banking arm assisted Interliant in 
 
 251. Mathew Honan & Steven Leckart, 10 Years After: A Look Back at the DotCom Boom and Bust, (Feb. 
17, 2010) WIRED, https://www.wired.com/2010/02/10yearsafter/. 
 252. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 253. H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 19 (1988). 
 254. See Merrill Lynch, IMPACT LAW, http://www.lawyershop.com/practice-areas/criminal-law/white-
collar-crimes/securities-fraud/lawsuits/merrill-lynch/ (last visited July 27, 2019) (explaining that, at this time, 
analysts were labeling stock a “good buy” to the public, but a “bad buy” to other analysts). Examples include: 
“Internet Capital Group (ICGE): E-mail: “October 6, 2000 – ‘No helpful news to relate, I’m afraid. This has 
been a disaster- there really is no floor to the stock,’” followed by “Investor advice: October 5, 2000 – 2-1 rating 
(buy to strong buy); “excite@home (ATHM): E-mail: June 3, 2000 – ‘ATHM is such a piece of crap!’” followed 
by “Investor advice: June 3, 2000 – 2-1 rating (buy to strong buy);” “Lifeminders (LFMN) E-mail: December 
4, 2000 – ‘I can’t believe what a POS that thing is,’” followed by “Investor advice: December 4, 2000 – 2-1 
rating (buy to strong buy).” Id. 
 255. Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., 396 F.3d 161, 167 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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its acquisition of 27 companies, and underwrote a $150 million convertible-bond 
offering.”256 The analysts hyped their ratings, not just to obtain investment 
banking work for their firms, but sometimes for personal profit, such as getting 
their daughters into nursery school.257 
The scandal came to light when New York State Attorney General Eliot 
Spitzer announced litigation against Merrill Lynch.258 Merrill Lynch, at first, 
denied the allegations, but then settled for $100 million and agreed to revise its 
practices with respect to analysts.259 Within a year of Merrill Lynch being sued, 
ten top United States investment banking firms agreed to pay a total of $875 
million in penalties and disgorgement for similar practices.260 
As a result of this litigation, supposedly there would be a Chinese wall 
between analysts and the investment banking side of the firm. As the Newman 
case illustrates,261 there does not appear to be any Chinese wall between analysts 
and portfolio managers at hedge funds. 
In 1988, Congress was concerned about the dissemination of inside 
information within investment banking firms that led to what it considered 
illegal insider trading. To remedy this, Congress required investment banking 
firms to implement procedures to prevent insider trading or else face liability 
themselves: 
The mergers and acquisition departments of investment houses contain 
highly sensitive materials detailing the intricacies of corporate takeovers, 
invaluable information in the hands of skilled market professionals. In the 
view of the Committee, there is a need for an affirmative statutory obligation 
for every broker, dealer and investment advisor to design effective 
procedures to restrict and monitor access to such information and prevent 
insider trading. The Committee links this affirmative obligation to the ITSA 
penalties. The Committee believed it is necessary to expand the potential 
exposure to civil penalties under ITSA beyond the primary insider trading 
violators to securities firms and other “controlling persons” who knowingly 
 
 256. Id. 
 257. Jack Grubman, one of the leading analysts on Wall Street, sent an e-mail stating that his boss, Sanford 
Weill, the chairman of Citigroup and a member of the Board of Directors of AT&T, helped Grubman to get his 
twin daughters enrolled in an exclusive nursery school after Grubman began recommending AT&T stock. See 
Gretchen Morgenson & Patrick McGeehan, Wall St. and the Nursery School: A New York Story, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 14, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/14/business/wall-st-and-the-nursery-school-a-new-york-
story.html. Mr. Weill has acknowledged that he asked Grubman to "take a fresh look at AT&T," which was code 
on Wall Street for changing your opinion. Id. 
 258. Merrill Ordered to Reform Ratings: New York AG Wins Court Order Finding Brokerage Firm Issued 
‘Misleading Stock Ratings,’ CNN MONEY, (Apr. 8, 2002), http://money.cnn.com/2002/04/08/news/companies/ 
merrill/index.htm. 
 259. The Merrill Lynch Settlement: Good for Merrill, Not for Investors, WHARTON (June 5, 2002), 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-merrill-lynch-settlement-good-for-merrill-not-for-investors/. 
 260. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement 
Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest between Research and Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm. 
 261. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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or recklessly fail to take the appropriate measures to prevent insider trading 
violations by their employees.262 
The securities industry has changed markedly since 1988, and hedge funds 
have joined investment banking firms as significant players in the securities 
markets. If it was necessary in 1988 to constrain the use of inside information 
by investment banks, it is all the more necessary today to constrain the use of 
such information by hedge funds. Unfortunately, the Newman case, discussed in 
the following section, is a step in the wrong direction. 
IV. THE CURRENT SITUATION ON INSIDER TRADING 
Federal courts recently handed down three noteworthy decisions: 
Newman,263 by the Second Circuit in 2014; Salman,264 by the Supreme Court in 
2016; and Martoma,265 by the Second Circuit in 2017 as a counterpoint to 
Newman. The facts in these cases have become all too typical since, as Congress 
has stated, “insider trading continues because it presents the opportunity to reap 
huge profits with little risk”266 and there is a “public perception that the risk of 
detection is slight.”267 Unfortunately, after Newman, there could be public 
perception that, if you make the tipping extensive and convoluted enough, there 
is no liability for insider trading.268 
A. NEWMAN—THE BENEFIT REQUIREMENT CARRIED TO THE EXTREME 
Let us consider the facts in Newman, as recounted by the Court: 
The Government alleged that a cohort of analysts at various hedge funds and 
investment firms obtained material, nonpublic information from employees 
of publicly traded technology companies, shared it amongst each other, and 
subsequently passed this information to the portfolio managers at their 
respective companies. The Government charged Newman, a portfolio 
manager at Diamondback Capital Management, LLC (“Diamondback”), and 
Chiasson, a portfolio manager at Level Global Investors, L.P. (“Level 
Global”), with willfully participating in this insider trading scheme by 
trading in securities based on the inside information illicitly obtained by this 
group of analysts.269 
 
 262. H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 15 (1988). 
 263. Newman, 773 F.3d at 438. 
 264. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016). 
 265. United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017). 
 266. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 21 (1983). 
 267. Id. at 6. 
 268. Shortly after the Enron decision by the Federal District Court in Texas, in response to a friend who was 
the editor, I wrote a quick, “pop” piece for the Chicago Bar Record in which I coined the phrase “MICI” as a 
counterpoint to the phrase “KISS.” Charles W. Murdock, Attorney Liability Under Enron, CHI. BAR REC., Apr., 
2003, at 34, 36. KISS, which stands for “keep it simple stupid,” is the tack taken by honest people. On the other 
hand, MICI, which stands for “make it complex idiot,” is now the order of the day, after Newman, for those who 
want to make a quick killing through insider trading. Id. 
 269. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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What is your reaction to the foregoing set of facts? What would be the reaction 
of most Americans? What would be the reaction of the Congress that enacted 
ITSA and ITSFEA? 
Corporate employees, who received information because of their positions, 
and who knew that the information was available to them only for use in 
connection with their employment, and not for their personal benefit or for the 
personal benefit of others, improperly transmitted this information to analysts at 
hedge funds who, in a chain of tipping, transmitted the information to portfolio 
managers, who then traded upon the information and made substantial profits. 
Do courts ever step back and look at the foregoing situation from the 
perspective of whether this activity is right or wrong? Whether this type of 
activity is to be encouraged or curtailed? Whether this type of activity is 
consistent with the mandate of the securities laws that there is to be a level 
playing field and that no investor should have an undue advantage over any other 
investor? Are these people making millions of dollars because of their analytical 
abilities or by cheating? According to the government, the “club” in Newman 
made $72 million in trading profits.270 Are the federal courts not complicit by 
condoning this cheating activity? Is it any wonder that a substantial amount of 
our electorate is disenchanted with government and thinks that the system is 
rigged for those with money and power? 
I now turn to how the Second Circuit dealt with the factual situation it 
recounted. Let us take the facts, as recounted by the Court,271 and put them in 
graphical form: 
 
 270. Peter Lattman, Ex-Hedge Fund Manager Sentenced in Insider Trading Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 
2013, at B3. 
 271. Newman, 773 F.3d at 443. 
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According to the Court, there were two critical questions that one cannot 
glean by looking at the foregoing chain of transactions. The first is whether the 
tippers, Robert Ray of Dell and Chris Choi of NVIDIA, received a personal 
benefit for the tipping. The second question is whether the persons who 
ultimately traded in the stocks of the respective companies knew of the benefit 
the tippers received. 
The appropriate response to both these “significant” questions addressed 
by the Second Circuit is ultimately, “who cares?” Is it wrong for tippers to 
disclose information only if they receive a personal benefit, as the Supreme 
Court, in Dirks, foolishly held? What difference does it make from the 
perspective of a level playing field or ensuring that no investor has an undue 
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advantage over another investor, whether or not the tippers received a benefit? 
They had information that should have been used solely for the benefit of their 
employer and not for their own benefit or the benefit of anyone outside the 
company. The plain fact of the matter is that it makes no difference whatsoever 
whether the tippers received a benefit. The harm is the same irrespective of 
whether the tippers received a personal benefit or not. 
Next, let’s examine the concept of personal benefit. Clearly, receipt of ten 
dollars would be a personal benefit. It is certainly a pecuniary benefit as 
articulated in Dirks. But is the legality or illegality of insider trading to be 
premised on such a tenuous benefit? What about a hundred dollars? Or a 
thousand dollars? 
What if the tippee invited the tipper for a drink? Would that be a benefit to 
the tipper? Would it make a difference which one paid for the drinks? Or what 
if the tippee had simply been nice to the tipper and empathized with the tipper 
regarding a personal tragedy or difficulties on the job with an overbearing boss?  
In law school, we are trained to be logical and conclude that no one would 
do something illegal on such a flimsy “emotional” or “psychological” basis. But 
the reality is that a kind word may be worth far more than a $100 bill. Why 
should courts anguish over whether or not something constitutes a benefit when 
the existence of a benefit is irrelevant to the public policy involved? 
The Dirks notion that the tipper must receive a benefit in order to sin was 
a convenient conclusion for an outcome-determinative Justice, aggressively 
advocating for the corporate world. Justice Powell let a member of a class that 
he admired—analysts—off the hook. This flawed logic should not be enshrined 
in subsequent judicial decisions. 
Unfortunately, the law has not yet caught up with the economic profession, 
where behavioral economics now recognizes that people do not always act in an 
abstract rational fashion.272 The law, instead of philosophizing about whether or 
not the tipper received what could be considered a rational benefit, should look 
to the act and not the motivation. We cannot get inside someone’s head to 
determine what is important to them, a $100 bill or an empathetic response. 
Even more absurd is the notion adopted in Newman that the person 
ultimately held liable must know of a “personal benefit” obtained by a remote 
tipper. What is necessary to hold a defendant, such as Newman, liable is an 
important question. He obviously must have scienter. But for what knowledge 
should he be held accountable? Should he be liable if the analyst gave the 
corporate employee a $100 bill and he knew that the money was passed, but not 
liable if he did not know? This question goes again to the basic issue of the 
wrong sought to be remedied. Is it the evil corporate employees wrongfully 
passing information, or corporate employees wrongfully passing information for 
profit? 
 
 272. For an overview of behavioral economic and its findings, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST 
AND SLOW (2011). 
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Since information is a corporate asset, possessed by the employees only for 
a corporate purpose and available to employees only to be used for the 
corporation’s benefit and not that of the employee, any transfer of material non-
public information outside the corporation without specific authorization to do 
so should be presumptively wrongful. 
Assuming arguendo that the tipper must receive a benefit, why is it 
necessary that the tippee know of the benefit? The tippee knows that the 
corporate employee has a duty not to disseminate corporate information outside 
the corporation. The tippee knows that the information is material and 
nonpublic. Is this not a sufficient basis to find culpability? 
Since a portfolio manager is responsible for investing millions of dollars 
for the benefit of others, should such a manager not know the basis for the 
recommendation to purchase a particular stock? Should he or she not know the 
basis for the recommendation provided by the analysts and the source of the 
information upon which the analysts were basing their recommendation? And 
would he or she not be reckless in failing to investigate? Would we expect a 
portfolio manager investing millions of dollars to blindly rely upon someone’s 
recommendation to purchase a particular stock? 
Any other approach invites the trader or portfolio manager to send his 
minions to ferret out information with the coda—I don’t care how you get it, just 
don’t tell me. 
The Newman fact pattern reflects the MICI concept:273 the more 
complicated the fraud, the less the likelihood of any accountability. Federal 
courts want a nice, clean set of facts: A tips B in exchange for A receiving cash 
or an equivalent tip from B. Courts would do well to read The Den of Thieves to 
learn how intermingled and intermeshed the web of insider trading can be.274 
Newman reflects such a situation. As the Court recognized, “a cohort of analysts 
at various hedge funds and investment firms obtained material, nonpublic 
information from employees of publicly traded technology companies, shared it 
amongst each other, and subsequently passed this information to the portfolio 
managers at their respective companies.”275  
I have argued above that the use of such inside information by portfolio 
managers of hedge funds is wrongful. But that is not the way the Second Circuit 
saw the situation in Newman. 
In Newman, the government conceded that it must establish that the tipper 
received a personal benefit. However, the government argued that Dirks only 
required that the “tippee know that the tipper disclosed information in breach of 
a duty.”276 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit held that “the corporate insider has 
committed no breach of fiduciary duty unless he receives a personal benefit in 
 
 273. See supra note 268. 
 274. See SHEELAH KOLHATKAR, BLACK EDGE: INSIDE INFORMATION, DIRTY MONEY, AND THE QUEST TO 
BRING DOWN THE MOST WANTED MAN ON WALL STREET (2017) [hereinafter BLACK EDGE]. 
 275. Newman, 773 F.3d at 442. 
 276. Id. at 447. 
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exchange for the disclosure,”277 parroting Dirks,278 and thus, the tippee cannot 
know of the breach unless the tippee also knows of the benefit. 
But, as argued earlier, this is sheer nonsense. A corporate employee holds 
the information he or she has for the benefit of the corporation, not for the benefit 
of himself or herself or anyone else.279 Any unauthorized disclosure of such 
information is wrongful and a breach of fiduciary duty. 
Moreover, the whole idea of requiring a benefit to the tipper as a condition 
of liability for the tipper is also utter nonsense. What if, in the Newman situation, 
Goyal and Tortora got their tippers drunk, pried out the information, and told 
Newman and Chiasson the nonpublic information. Is this now a legitimate 
situation with no insider trading liability? What if Newman and Chiasson 
suggested the ploy of getting the tippers drunk? Would we find a benefit to the 
tippers because of the free alcohol they consumed? What if they paid for their 
own drinks? 
Slavish adherence to the flawed decision in Dirks leads to absurd results. 
As Congress has suggested, Dirks will do no mischief if limited to its narrow 
factual situation involving an attempt to publicize a fraud.280 
The Second Circuit completed its circle of logic by holding that defendants 
must know of the benefit in order to be liable because, without the benefit, there 
is no breach of duty. The Court was shocked that the government would try to 
hold liable tippees who are separated by many levels from their tippers, “[t]he 
Government’s overreliance on our prior dicta merely highlights the doctrinal 
novelty of its recent insider trading prosecutions, which are increasingly targeted 
at remote tippees many levels removed from corporate insiders.”281 
This ignores the reality of how the game is played. Consider the diagram 
above. There was obviously a web of analysts exchanging information. But there 
was no market impact until the portfolio managers traded. The Second Circuit 
seemed disturbed that the government went after the portfolio managers in a 
criminal proceeding but not the analysts: 
Although Ray has yet to be charged administratively, civilly, or criminally, 
and Choi has yet to be charged criminally, for insider trading or any other 
 
 277. Id. at 447. 
 278. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983). 
 279. Since the Supreme Court is enamored with common law notions of fiduciary duty, they might well 
read the early case of Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232, 234 (Ga. 1903): 
It might be that the director was in possession of information which his duty to the company required 
him to keep secret; and, if so, he must not disclose the fact even to the shareholder, for his obligation 
to the company overrides that to an individual holder of the stock. But if the fact so known to the 
director cannot be published, it does not follow that he may use it to his own advantage, and to the 
disadvantage of one whom he also represents. The very fact that he cannot disclose prevents him 
from dealing with one who does not know, and to whom material information cannot be made 
known. . . . In a certain sense the information is a quasi asset of the company, and the shareholder is 
as much entitled to the advantage of that sort of an asset as to any other regularly entered on the list 
of the company’s holding. 
 280. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 15 (1983). 
 281. Newman, 773 F.3d at 448. 
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wrongdoing, the Government charged that Newman and Chiasson were 
criminally liable for insider trading because, as sophisticated traders, they 
must have known that information was disclosed by insiders in breach of a 
fiduciary duty, and not for any legitimate corporate purpose.282 
Absolutely! The portfolio managers knew that this was material, non-
public information. How else could it have been obtained, except illegally? 
With regard to the reasons why the government went easy on Ray and Choi, 
the analysts, but zeroed in on Newman and Chiasson, the portfolio managers—
that is what typically happens in a corporate criminal matter. The government 
goes easier on the little fish in order to catch the big fish. Who has the power in 
a hedge fund: the portfolio manager or the analysts? If you want to shape up the 
power structure, you go after the portfolio managers. The portfolio managers 
often make tens or hundreds of millions of dollars,283 and, if you are going to 
affect a change in corporate culture, it is the portfolio managers that need to be 
held accountable. 
The analysts understand that their job is to ferret out information and give 
it to the portfolio managers who will trade on it. Everybody’s compensation is a 
function of trading profits. As suggested earlier, if the portfolio manager just 
winks and says, “do what you must to get me information, but don’t tell me 
about it,” the Second Circuit’s tack in Newman enables the portfolio manager to 
commit the perfect crime. 
Adhering to the Supreme Court decision in Dirks, the Second Circuit 
summarized the conditions for liability: 
First, the tippee’s liability derives only from the tipper’s breach of a fiduciary 
duty, not from trading on material, non-public information. Second, the 
corporate insider has committed no breach of fiduciary duty unless he 
receives a personal benefit in exchange for the disclosure. Third, even in the 
presence of a tipper’s breach, a tippee is liable only if he knows or should 
have known of the breach.284 
The Second Circuit acknowledged that, “[w]hile we have not yet been 
presented with the question of whether the tippee’s knowledge of a tipper’s 
breach requires knowledge of the tipper’s personal benefit, the answer follows 
naturally from Dirks.”285 The Second Circuit explained: “Dirks counsels us that 
the exchange of confidential information for personal benefit is not separate 
from an insider’s fiduciary breach; it [the personal benefit] is the fiduciary 
breach that triggers liability for securities fraud under Rule 10b–5.”286  
So, once again, the Dirks foolishness confounds accountability. As stated 
earlier, if the federal courts are really looking back to the common law to assess 
insider trading liability, an employee who discloses material corporate 
 
 282. Id. at 443–44. 
 283. Id. at 443. In Martoma, the hedge fund made $80.3 million in gains and avoided $194.6 million in 
losses. United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 62 (2d. Cir. 2017). 
 284. Newman, 773 F.3d at 447 (citation omitted).  
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 447–48.  
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information to an outsider without authority to do so breaches his or her fiduciary 
duty to the employer. The Second Circuit may have realized this since it added 
“[f]or purposes of insider trading liability, the insider’s disclosure of 
confidential information, standing alone, is not a breach.”287 The Court also 
stated that “a breach of the duty of confidentiality is not fraudulent unless the 
tipper acts for personal benefit.”288 
But why should there be this exception from the common law perspective 
on fiduciary duty when dealing with insider trading? Why is a breach of the duty 
of confidentiality not actionable? Is insider trading something that we should 
curtail because it deviates from the congressional notion of a level playing field, 
or should we encourage insider trading by erecting roadblocks to effective 
prosecution of insider trading? 
Based upon Dirks, the Second Circuit concluded that “without establishing 
that the tippee knows of the personal benefit received by the insider in exchange 
for the disclosure, the Government cannot meet its burden of showing that the 
tippee knew of a breach.”289 This phraseology suggests that, when an insider 
tips, there is a bargained for consideration: “I won’t give you a tip for $10 but I 
will for $100.” 
But whether the tippee must know of the nature of the benefit received by 
the tipper was an issue not reached by Dirks, as the Newman court 
acknowledged.290 As stated earlier, Congress thought that insider trading 
enforcement would not be impeded by Dirks if Dirks were limited to its facts.291 
But, instead of reading Dirks narrowly, Newman sought to extend its reach. 
Having determined that the tippee must know of the inside tipper’ s benefit, 
the Second Circuit then analyzed whether the tippers received a benefit. The 
Court acknowledged that “a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence [in a jury case] bears a heavy burden, as the standard of review is 
exceedingly deferential.”292 Nevertheless, “if the evidence ‘is nonexistent or . . . 
meager,’” the verdict can be set aside.293 In this case, the Second Circuit 
determined that “[t]he circumstantial evidence in this case was simply too thin 
to warrant the inference that the corporate insiders received any personal benefit 
in exchange for their tips.”294  
With respect to the Dell tip, the Second Circuit determined:  
Here the “career advice” that Goyal gave Ray, the Dell tipper, was little more 
than the encouragement one would generally expect of a fellow alumnus or 
casual acquaintance. Crucially, Goyal testified that he would have given Ray 
advice without receiving information because he routinely did so for industry 
 
 287. Id. at 448 (emphasis added).  
 288. Id. at 450.  
 289. Id. at 448.  
 290. Id. at 447–48. 
 291. See supra note 280 and accompanying text. 
 292. Newman, 773 F.3d. at 451.  
 293. Id. (quoting United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012)). 
 294. Id. at 451–52.  
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colleagues. Although the Government argues that the jury could have 
reasonably inferred from the evidence that Ray and Goyal swapped career 
advice for inside information, Ray himself disavowed that any such quid pro 
quo existed. Further, the evidence showed Goyal began giving Ray “career 
advice” over a year before Ray began providing any insider information. 
Thus, it would not be possible under the circumstances for a jury in a criminal 
trial to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ray received a personal benefit 
in exchange for the disclosure of confidential information.295 
Once again, this opinion ignores human nature and the way the world 
actually works. If Goyal had been giving Ray career advice for over a year, 
would Ray have felt indebted to Goyal? The Second Circuit was also impressed 
by the fact that Goyal testified that he would have given career advice to Ray 
even if Ray did not give him any tips. What federal courts do not get is that Ray 
and Goyal could be “nice guys” and generally pretty decent people. That does 
not mean that they could therefore do no wrong.  
In this regard, behavioral economics is instructive. As Professor Kahneman 
points out, human nature wants a consistent story. For example, people have a 
hard time accepting the fact that Hitler might have loved babies.296 Here, the 
Second Circuit could not fathom that Goyal could be a nice guy in providing 
career advice and still be a crook. 
In the NVIDIA case, the Second Circuit observed that Choi (the tipper) and 
Lim (the tippee) were “merely casual acquaintances.”297 Lim testified that “Choi 
did not know that Lim was trading NVIDIA stock (and in fact for the relevant 
period Lim did not trade stock), thus undermining any inference that Choi 
intended to make a ‘gift’ of the profits earned on any transaction based on 
confidential information.”298 What the Court failed to further observe is that Lim 
did pass the information on to others who did in fact trade.299 Since the two 
defendants were not close family members, as in Salman, according to the 
Newman court, there was no benefit to the tipper from the transfer of 
information. 
Again, what federal courts fail to realize is that there are many reasons why 
an insider may pass on confidential information. It may be because of friendship 
or an attempt to curry friendship. It might be an attempt to impress another with 
the insider’s position or access to information. Some people are just blowhards. 
It may be to get a “leg up” by being able to call in a favor at a later date. In the 
Salman case, discussed below, the younger brother gave the older brother 
information because the older brother “pestered” him.300 Although it may be 
 
 295. Id. at 453 (citations omitted). 
 296. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, supra note 272, at 200 (suggesting that if someone were to say that Hitler 
loved little children that such a statement would have a “shocking” effect).  
 297. Newman, 773 F.3d at 453.  
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at 443. 
 300. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 424 (2016). 
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unlikely, there may be bargained for consideration. While federal courts seem to 
think that this is the norm, it is likely the exception. 
But motive should be immaterial. Whatever the motive, the harmful effect 
is the same—an investor enters the market armed with information that the rest 
of the investing public does not have and cannot access. As the tippee/older 
brother in Salman said, his brother’s tips gave him “timely information that the 
average person does not have access to.”301 This is the unfair advantage that 
Congress proscribed.302 This also is the kind of activity that the SEC proscribed 
through Regulation FD.303  
The Second Circuit bulwarked its conclusion by citing the oft repeated 
statement in Dirks that “[a]ll disclosures of confidential corporate information 
are not inconsistent with the duty . . . to shareholders.”304 Why are they not 
inconsistent with the insider’s duty? 
The Second Circuit noted: 
Moreover, the evidence established that NVIDIA and Dell’s investor 
relations personnel routinely “leaked” earnings data in advance of quarterly 
earnings. Appellants introduced examples in which Dell insiders, including 
the head of Investor Relations, Lynn Tyson, selectively disclosed 
confidential quarterly financial information arguably similar to the inside 
information disclosed by Ray and Choi to establish relationships with 
financial firms who might be in a position to buy Dell’s stock. For example, 
appellants introduced an email Tortora sent Newman summarizing a 
conversation he had with Tyson in which she suggested “low 12% opex [was] 
reasonable” for Dell’s upcoming quarter and that she was “fairly confident 
on [operating margin] and [gross margin].”305 
This is shocking! Two wrongs do not make a right. While the Dirks opinion 
preceded Regulation FD, the release of earnings data today clearly violates 
Regulation FD and is therefore unlawful. The Second Circuit should have 
excoriated the investor relations personnel, not used their wrongful conduct to 
protect portfolio managers who made millions on trades which, in turn, enabled 
them to make millions in compensation.306  
 
 301. Id. at 425 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 302. See supra notes 11–13. 
 303. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2012). 
 304. Newman, 773 F.3d at 454 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 305. Id.  
 306. Average salaries for portfolio managers in the past years have been listed as $2.2 million in 2013. Katie 
Holliday, This Industry Has an Entry Level Salary of $335,000, CNBC (Nov. 3, 2013), https://www.cnbc.com/ 
2013/11/01/this-industry-has-an-entry-level-salary-of-335000.html. In 2014, the average salaries rose to $2.4 
million. Ansuya Harjani, Hedge Fund Manager Pay Rises to $2.4 Million, CNBC (Nov. 7, 2014), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2014/11/06/hedge-fund-manager-pay-rises-to-24-million.html. Then again, in 2015, 
they stayed relatively consistent at $2.21 million, and they posted at $2.23 million in 2016. Lawrence 
Delevingne, Hedge Fund Managers Have Lost Touch with Reality, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 21, 2016), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/r-rpt-hedge-funds-slow-to-adjust-champagne-tastes-to-beer-budgets-2016-11. 
For the securities industry in general, average salaries in the New York securities industry were $388,000 in 
2015. Wall Street Profits Up in 2016, N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/ 
press/releases/mar17/031517.htm. (reporting last numbers from 2015). In 2014, these salaries rose to $404,800. 
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The position of federal courts with regard to insider trading turns the stock 
market into a roulette game, with certain investors given the right to have their 
finger on the wheel. 
Obviously, Circuit Courts do not have the authority to overrule the 
Chiarella and Dirks decisions. However, they could follow the Congressional 
dictate to interpret these cases restrictively, rather than expanding their foolish 
policy to its logical, or illogical, extreme. 
B. SALMAN CASE—REPUDIATION OF NEWMAN’S PECUNIARY BENEFIT 
REQUIREMENT 
The Salman case is almost anticlimactic. Had the Supreme Court taken the 
Newman case, the opinion could have had a significant impact on the law of 
insider trading. However, due to the present composition of the Supreme Court, 
this impact probably would have been negative. So, those of us who believe 
insider trading is wrongful and should be curtailed, should be thankful the 
Supreme Court chose to review Salman. 
Salman was a pedestrian “gift” exception to the requirement that the tipper 
received a personal benefit. The tipper, Maher Kara, was the brother of the 
intermediate tippee/tipper, Michael, who passed the information on to the 
tipper’s brother-in-law, Salman.307 Salman argued, relying upon Newman, that 
“there was no evidence that Maher received anything of ‘a pecuniary or similarly 
valuable nature’ in exchange—or that Salman knew of any such benefit.”308 On 
the other hand, the government argued, properly so in my opinion, that “a gift of 
confidential information to anyone, not just a ‘trading relative or friend,’ is 
enough to prove securities fraud.”309 
To the extent that Newman “held that the tipper must also receive 
something of a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to 
family or friends,”310 the Supreme Court rejected Newman, and held that “[w]e 
adhere to Dirks, which easily resolve[d] the narrow issue presented here.”311  
However, the Court did not seem to realize that some of its analysis is 
inconsistent with Dirks and its requirement of a personal benefit. The Court 
pointed out that Salman’s counsel acknowledged that “Maher would have 
breached his duty had he personally traded on the information here himself then 
given the proceeds as a gift to his brother,”312 and concluded that, “[i]t is obvious 
that Maher would personally benefit in that situation.”313 In other words, trading 
 
Wall Street Bonuses and Profits Decline in 2015, N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER (Mar. 7, 2016), 
http://osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/mar16/030716.htm (reporting the 2014 numbers).  
 307. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 423–24 (2016).  
 308. Id. at 425.  
 309. Id. at 426.  
 310. Id. at 428.  
 311. Id. at 427.  
 312. Id. at 427–28.  
 313. Id.at 428. 
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on inside information by an insider is wrong and is a breach of fiduciary duty to 
the employer:  
Here, by disclosing confidential information as a gift to his brother with the 
expectation that he would trade on it, Maher breached his duty of trust and 
confidence to Citigroup and its clients—a duty Salman acquired, and 
breached himself, by trading on the information with full knowledge that it 
had been improperly disclosed.314 
When the Court recognized that Maher would have breached his fiduciary 
duty had he himself traded, the Court noted that he would then obtain a personal 
benefit.315 But the person who obtains the personal benefit is always the person 
who trades on the inside information. Dirks’s fundamental flaw was requiring 
that the disclosing/tipper receive a benefit rather than the tippee/recipient of the 
information who thereupon trades. 
The Supreme Court recognized the fundamental unfairness in permitting 
insiders or their tippees to trade on confidential inside information. The Court 
recounted Michael’s testimony: “For his part, Michael told the jury that his 
brother’s tips gave him ‘timely information that the average person does not 
have access to’ and ‘access to stocks, options, and what have you, that I can 
capitalize on, that the average person would never have or dream of.’”316 
Since the two brothers and their brother-in-law were close relatives, the 
Court had no difficulty in affirming the wrongdoing. But what if they were 
distant relatives or as the government argued, not relatives at all? What 
difference would it make? The evil is the same. Maher is providing “timely 
information that the average person does not have access to.”317 This is the evil, 
not the personal benefit or lack thereof that the tipper experiences. 
But the Supreme Court, in dicta before addressing the gift situation, 
reverted to the notion that insider trading involving non-family tippees is only 
wrongful when there is a “quid pro quo”318 between the insider and the tippee, 
essentially applying contractual notions of a bargained for consideration, 
without realizing that there can be many reasons why an insider would pass 
along information. 
C. MARTOMA—CONSTRAINING NEWMAN’S “MEANINGFULLY CLOSE 
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP” REQUIREMENT 
While Salman was a pedestrian application of the gift language in Dirks to 
a fairly rare situation—the transmission of inside information within a close 
family relationship—and involved a pittance—319 compared to the hundreds of 
 
 314. Id. 
 315. See id. at 427. 
 316. Id. at 425.  
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. at 427.  
 319. The trader in Salman made only $1.5 million in profits, while the “club” in Newman made $72 million 
in insider trading profits, and the insider trading in Martoma generated $80.3 million in gains and avoided $190.6 
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millions of dollars involved in Newman—Martoma was a very significant 
application of the Dirks gift language to a much more typical case of insider 
trading.320 
Martoma was a portfolio manager for S.A.C. Capital Advisers (SAC), a 
hedge fund that was the subject of a massive insider trading investigation.321 His 
portfolio had between $400 and $500 million in buying power and was focused 
upon the pharmaceutical and healthcare industry.322 He also recommended 
securities to Stephen Cohen, the head of SAC, who managed to avoid 
indictment.323 
Martoma invested funds in Elan and Wyeth pharmaceutical companies, 
which were trying to develop an experimental drug to treat Alzheimer’s 
disease.324 He also recommended these investments to Cohen.325 To get 
information about the drug, Martoma established a relationship with two 
doctors, Dr. Gilman and Dr. Ross, who were working on its clinical trials.326 
They were paid $1000 and $1500 an hour, respectively; however, the doctors 
were not paid directly by Martoma.327 His payments were routed through an 
expert networking firm to the doctors.328 Dr. Gilman met with Martoma forty-
three times and provided Martoma with updates on the safety of the drug, 
information Dr. Gilman was expected to keep confidential.329 
A June 17, 2008 press release described preliminary results as 
“encouraging” and the price of Elan stock rose following the press release.330 
The press release also announced that results would be presented in greater detail 
at an international conference on Alzheimer’s on July 29, 2008.331 Dr. Gilman 
was selected to present the results on July 29 and was then given the final results 
of the clinical study.332 
Dr. Gilman identified “two major weaknesses in the data,” and the 
following day, July 17, he called Martoma and spoke with him for 90 minutes.333 
Two days later, Martoma flew to Ann Arbor and met with Dr. Gilman in his 
office, where Dr. Gilman showed him a PowerPoint presentation on the efficacy 
 
million in losses. See id. at 424; United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2017) (Martoma I). 
 320. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 58 (Martoma I). After this Article was in production, the Second Circuit amended 
the opinion, 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018) (Martoma II). See infra Subpart IV.C.3. 
 321. James B. Stewart, On Insider Trading, an Appeals Court Comes to Its Senses, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/14/business/insider-trading-court.html. 
 322. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 61. 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. at 61, n.1. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 61–62, 67. 
 330. Id. at 62.  
 331. Id. at 62. 
 332. Id.  
 333. Id.  
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of the study and discussed the data with him in detail.334 Dr. Gilman did not bill 
for the phone conversation or this meeting.335 
The next morning, Martoma sent Cohen an email labeled “It’s important,” 
and followed with a telephone call, after which Martoma emailed Cohen a 
summary of Elan and Wyeth holdings.336 On Monday, SAC began to hedge its 
position in these two companies through short sales and option trades.337 After 
the results were made public on July 29, the next day, the price of Elan and 
Wyeth declined by 42% and 12%, respectively, and the trades that Martoma and 
Cohen made generated $80.3 million in gains and avoided $194.6 million in 
losses.338 Thereafter, Martoma received a $9 million bonus.339 
Martoma argued that he and Dr. Gilman did not have a “meaningfully close 
personal relationship” and that Dr. Gilman did not receive any “objective, 
consequential . . . gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature” in connection 
with providing information to Martoma, relying upon the standards set in 
Newman.340 Martoma also argued that the jury instructions were erroneous 
because they did not include the limitations on personal benefit set forth in 
Newman.341 
1. Martoma I: Reversing Newman 
The Martoma I court declined to rely upon Newman because the 
intervening Supreme Court decision in Salman held that “[t]o the extent the 
Second Circuit [in Newman] held that a tipper must also receive something of a 
‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to family or 
friends . . . this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks.”342 
The Martoma court first determined that Martoma had received a 
pecuniary benefit: 
Martoma was a frequent and lucrative client for Dr. Gilman, who was paid 
$1,000 per hour for approximately 43 consultation sessions. At the same 
time, Dr. Gilman was regularly feeding Martoma confidential information 
about the safety results of clinical trials involving bapineuzumab. And when 
Dr. Gilman gained access to the final clinical study efficacy data in July 
2008, he immediately passed it along to Martoma.343 
The Court acknowledged that “Dr. Gilman did not bill Martoma 
specifically for the July 17 and 19, 2008 meetings at which Dr. Gilman provided 
 
 334. Id. at 62.  
 335. Id. at 67.  
 336. Id. at 62.  
 337. Id. 
 338. Id.  
 339. Id. at 62–63. 
 340. Id. at 65 (alteration in original).  
 341. Id. 
 342. Id. at 80 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (quoting Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016)) (citation 
omitted). 
 343. Id. at 67.  
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Martoma with the efficacy data,”344 a factor which the dissent thought 
significant.345 However, Martoma acknowledged at trial that, had he billed for 
the July meetings, this would have been “tantamount to confessing that [he] 
was . . . giving [Martoma] inside information.”346 The majority therefore 
concluded that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain 
Martoma’s conviction: Dr. Gilman regularly disclosed confidential information 
in exchange for fees; therefore “‘a rational trier of fact could have found the 
essential elements of the crime [of insider trading] beyond a reasonable doubt’ 
under a pecuniary quid pro quo theory.”347 
The Martoma I court then turned to the adequacy of the jury instructions. 
It reversed the Newman precedent on the basis of the intervening Supreme Court 
opinion in Salman regarding jury instructions. 348 The Salman opinion explicitly 
rejected the Newman requirement that a tipper, in a gift situation, must receive 
something of a “pecuniary or similarly valuable nature” in exchange for a gift to 
family or friends.349 The Martoma court, in determining that Newman’s 
requirement of a “meaningfully close personal relationship” was also no longer 
valid, first acknowledged that: 
While the Supreme Court did not have occasion to expressly overrule 
Newman’s requirement that the tipper have a “meaningfully close personal 
relationship” with a tippee to justify the inference that a tipper received a 
personal benefit from his gift of inside information—because that aspect of 
Newman was not at issue in Salman—“[e]ven if the effect of a Supreme 
Court decision is ‘subtle,’ it may nonetheless alter the relevant analysis 
fundamentally enough to require overruling prior, ‘inconsistent’ 
precedent.”350 
The Martoma I court then concluded: 
We respectfully conclude that Salman fundamentally altered the analysis 
underlying Newman’s “meaningfully close personal relationship” 
requirement such that the “meaningfully close personal relationship” 
requirement is no longer good law. In a case involving a tipper and tippee 
who were brothers, Salman found it “obvious” that an insider would 
personally benefit from “trad[ing] on [inside] information . . . himself and 
then giv[ing] the proceeds as a gift to his brother.” And Salman observed that 
 
 344. Id.  
 345. The dissent pointed out that Dr. Gilman “did not bill for the sessions in July of 2008 during which he 
gave Martoma the information leading to Martoma’s trades.” Id. at 90 (Pooler, J., dissenting). The dissent opined 
that “a jury could have believed SAC’s payments were for information Gilman told Martoma during other 
sessions—information that was either public, non-material, or did not prompt a trade, and thus was not a violation 
of insider-trading laws. Id. at 91 (Pooler, J., dissenting). As developed in the next section, the dissent represents 
a mode of thinking by federal courts that is rigid and logical, but irrational, since it is predicated upon a view of 
human nature that is at odds with reality. 
 346. Id. at 67 (alterations in original).  
 347. Id. (quoting United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (alterations in original)). 
 348. Id. at 61. 
 349. Salman v. United States, 137. S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016). 
 350. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 69 (quoting Wojchowski v. Daines, 498 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation 
omitted) (alterations in original).  
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an insider “effectively achieve[s] the same result by disclosing the 
information to [the tippee], and allowing him to trade on it,” because “giving 
a gift of [inside] information is the same thing as trading by the tipper 
followed by a gift of the proceeds.”351 
The Court also supported its conclusion from the fact that Salman 
referenced the following statement from Dirks:352 “Not only are insiders 
forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from personally using undisclosed 
corporate information to their advantage, but they may not give such information 
to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for 
their personal gain.”353 
The Martoma I court indicated its dissatisfaction with the result reached in 
Newman, where although portfolio managers realized tens of millions of dollars 
in insider trading profits, their convictions were not upheld because the 
relationship between the tippers and the tippees was not a “meaningfully close 
personal relationship”: 
Nothing in Salman’s reaffirmation of this [gift] logic supports a distinction 
between gifts to people with whom a tipper shares a “meaningfully close 
personal relationship”—a term left undefined in Newman, but which 
apparently did not reach two people who “had known each other for years, 
having both attended business school and worked . . . together,”—and gifts 
to those with whom a tipper does not share such a relationship.354 
The following example was used by the court to illustrate a situation where 
there is not a meaningfully close personal relationship, but yet a benefit to the 
tipper: 
Imagine that a corporate insider, instead of giving a cash end-of-year gift to 
his doorman, gives a tip of inside information with instructions to trade on 
the information and consider the proceeds of the trade to be his end-of-year 
gift. In this example, there may not be a “meaningfully close personal 
relationship” between the tipper and tippee, yet this clearly is an illustration 
of prohibited insider trading, as the insider has given a tip of valuable inside 
information in lieu of a cash gift and has thus personally benefitted from the 
disclosure.355 
Accordingly, the court held as follows: 
Thus, we hold that an insider or tipper personally benefits from a disclosure 
of inside information whenever the information was disclosed “with the 
expectation that [the recipient] would trade on it,” and the disclosure 
“resemble[s] trading by the insider followed by a gift of the profits to the 
recipient,” whether or not there was a “meaningfully close personal 
relationship” between the tipper and tippee.356 
 
 351. Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
 352. Salman, 137. S. Ct. at 428. 
 353. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983). 
 354. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 69 (citation omitted) (second alteration in original). 
 355. Id. at 70. 
 356. Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
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This is a common-sense approach to the problem of insider trading. In my 
opinion, the tipper has “sinned” any time the tipper discloses material nonpublic 
information that the tipper is obligated to keep confidential. Yet, for the tipper 
to “sin,” the tipper must have scienter and, pursuant to the approach taken by the 
Martoma court, the tipper’s wrongful state of mind is determined by the fact that 
the information is conveyed with the expectation that the tippee will trade on it. 
Hopefully, the Martoma I approach will be followed in other jurisdictions. 
But as reflected in the dissenting opinion discussed below, an outcome-
determinative court that is more focused on an abstract analysis of Dirks, and 
that does not appreciate either the caution of Congress to read Dirks narrowly or 
the negative effects of insider trading, could take a contrary approach. 
2. The Dissent in Martoma I—Majority’s Over-Extension of Salman 
The dissenting opinion in Martoma was extensive, logical to the extent that 
it relied upon Dirks, but an ultimately fallacious attempt to defend and 
rationalize the personal benefit requirement of Dirks. The dissent asserted that, 
while the Supreme Court in Salman overruled Newman “‘[t]o the extent that it 
required an insider to ‘receive something of a pecuniary or similarly valuable 
nature,’” the Supreme Court “showed no disapproval of the ‘meaningfully close 
personal relationship’ language in Newman.”357 Thus, the dissent acknowledged 
that, in an insider trading case predicated upon the gift theory, there is no need 
to show that the insider/tipper received a pecuniary or similar benefit, but argued 
that there still must be a meaningfully close personal relationship between the 
tipper and the tippee in order to apply the gift theory in Dirks.358 
So, let us examine the rationale, as explicated by the dissent, as to why a 
meaningfully close personal relationship is necessary in order to apply the gift 
theory. 
First, the rationale of Dirks, as analyzed by the dissent, for requiring a 
benefit to the tipper was to introduce “objectivity” into the analysis.359 But how 
objective is a determination of whether or not there is a “meaningfully close 
personal relationship” among the parties? What if the brothers, in Salman, had 
been alienated from each other for a number of years? Then, inexplicitly from a 
purely logical perspective, one brother tips the other. Was this done in an attempt 
to mend the relationship? Is there now a “meaningfully close personal 
relationship?” Or did the tipping brother simply get tired of being badgered?As 
the Supreme Court recounted in Salman, “Maher explained that he disclosed the 
 
 357. Id. at 80 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (quoting Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428). 
 358. Id. at 87 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
 359. Id. at 76 (Pooler, J., dissenting). The dissent, quoting Dirks, stated: “The Supreme Court also noted that 
the question of whether an insider personally benefitted from disclosure would ‘require[ ] courts to focus on 
objective criteria.’” Id. (Pooler, J., dissenting) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983)) (alteration in 
original). The dissent continued, “[r]ather than courts attempting to ‘read the parties’ minds,’ they would look 
to ‘objective facts and circumstances that [would] justify . . . an inference’ that an insider received a personal 
benefit.” Id. (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663–64) (Pooler, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (second and third 
alterations in original). 
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information in large part to appease Michael (who pestered him incessantly for 
it).”360 
But why do we care? The tipping brother breached his duty to the 
corporation by disclosing confidential, nonpublic, material corporate 
information. This is where objectivity comes into play. The tipping brother was 
employed by the corporation; he received material nonpublic information, not 
for his own benefit, but to use for the benefit of the corporation. He disclosed 
such information in breach of his duty to the corporation to keep material 
nonpublic information within the corporate entity.361 
The negative impact to existing shareholders from this breach of duty can 
easily be identified in a “bad news” situation. The tippee brother uses the 
information to sell stock to avoid a personal loss, thereby depressing the price 
of the stock and the price that other shareholders would receive when they seek 
to sell.362 Arguably, in a “good news” situation, the action of the tippee brother 
raises the price of the stock and, possibly, only non-shareholders who seek to 
buy are adversely affected. But this argument misses two fundamental points: 
first, there might be existing shareholders who seek to increase their position in 
the company and are thereby disadvantaged. Second, the purpose of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act was to ensure that all participants in securities 
transactions play on a level playing field.363 
In arguing for the personal benefit requirement in situations not involving 
a meaningfully close relationship, the dissent in Martoma I offered several 
examples which, supposedly, demonstrated the necessity of such requirement.364 
However, none of these rationales hold water.  
The first example was of an insider who revealed information 
inadvertently. However, today, after the adoption of Regulation FD, the insider 
in such a situation has an obligation to make a prompt public disclosure.365 
Moreover, as in Cady, Roberts, a person who makes an inadvertent disclosure 
would have no liability, but the person who takes advantage of such inadvertent 
disclosure should be liable.366 Analyzing the situation from another perspective, 
the insider making an inadvertent disclosure would not have scienter, while the 
trading tippee would have scienter. 
A second example suggested by the dissent is that “insiders speaking for 
public-spirited reasons, such as ‘a desire to expose . . . fraud,’ do not commit 
 
 360. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 424 (2016). 
 361. Id. 
 362. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
 363. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
 364. See Martoma, 869 F.3d at 85-86 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
 365. See 17 CFR § 243.100(a)(2) (2012) (stating that whenever any person acting on behalf of an issuer 
discloses any material nonpublic information regarding the issuer or its securities, the issuer shall make public 
disclosure of such information “[p]romptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure.”). 
 366. In re Cady, Roberts, & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910–13 (1961). 
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insider trading.”367 The dissent took this example from the Dirks case. As 
previously discussed, in Dirks, the majority and the dissent were watching two 
different movies. The majority saw Dirks as a hero, exposing a fraud, while the 
dissent saw Dirks as an opportunist who, pursuant to the “backscratching” that 
was prevalent in the securities industry at that time, obtained a fee of $25,000 
for his employer as a result of “looking after” their clients.368 
If you want to stop a crime, the proper approach is to contact the SEC or 
the U.S. Attorney, not tip your clients so they can engage in so much trading that 
trading in the stock is eventually suspended. Dirks was hardly a public-spirited 
citizen! 
The Martoma I dissent utilizes the following example to show why the 
existence of a benefit to the tipper is necessary: “[A] situation where an insider 
conveys material, nonpublic information to a reporter, and the reporter tells it to 
a third person who trades on it. Such a situation is entirely plausible for a 
financial news reporter who speaks to many sources.”369 
What the dissent does not seem to realize is that the role of a reporter is to 
report, not tip others. If the reporter obtained the information under the guise 
that he or she was obtaining it in order to write a story, and instead used the 
information to benefit some friend or acquaintance, the reporter would be 
breaching the duty to his or her employer by using what is now the publication’s 
information for an improper purpose and, in addition, obtaining information 
under false pretenses. If the reporter publishes the information, the reporter may 
be enabling the issuer to fulfill its responsibility to disclose material information.  
But if the reporter first transmits the news to another person to enable them 
to trade ahead of the public dissemination of the information, this conduct by the 
reporter is wrongful and should subject the reporter to insider trading liability. 
This situation is similar to Carpenter, where Foster Winans, who wrote the 
“Heard on the Street” column for the Wall Street Journal, tipped a broker with 
Kidder Peabody to enable the broker to trade ahead of the news in Winans’s 
column.370 In this case, Winans did receive a benefit because he split the trading 
profits with the broker.371 But, irrespective of the fee splitting arrangement, 
Winans’ conduct was wrongful because he misappropriated the information of 
his employer for an improper purpose.372 
 In Salman, the Supreme Court noted that “the tipper benefits personally 
because giving a gift of trading information is the same as trading by the tipper 
followed by a gift of the proceeds.”373 The dissent in Martoma then took the 
majority to task for believing that “a benefit may be imputed to a gift-giver even 
 
 367. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 75 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983)) 
(alteration in original). 
 368. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 669 n.4 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 369. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 76 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
 370. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 22–23 (1984). 
 371. Id. at 27–28. 
 372. Id. at 24. 
 373. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016). 
J - MURDOCK_19 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2019 6:40 PM 
August 2019] THE FUTURE OF INSIDER TRADING 1603 
when the recipient is not a friend or relative.”374 The majority in Martoma took 
the position that the only question should be whether “the tip and trade resemble 
trading by the insider followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”375 
According to the dissent, the gift analogy may only be employed when the 
gift-giver obtains a benefit from the gift. From this proposition, the dissent 
would limit the gift analogy only to those situations where family or close 
friends are involved because only there does the gift-giver receive a benefit: 
Gifts to family or friends are more likely to confer a benefit upon the gift-
giver because, as noted above, “to help a close family member [or friend] is 
like helping yourself.” This is true for several reasons. First, a person often 
benefits directly when making significant gifts to friends and relatives. A 
family member who receives a new car or apartment (or even a book) might 
share it with the gift-giver; similarly, providing a stock tip to a relative may 
obviate the need to give the type of loan sometimes expected of close kin. A 
gift-giver may also benefit because of his or her genuine enjoyment of the 
recipient’s happiness. And last, the gift-giver may benefit from improved 
relations with friends or relatives. When gifts pass to relatives or friends, 
there is thus far greater reason than usual to believe that the gift-giver has 
benefitted personally, as the same benefits rarely accompany a gift to a casual 
acquaintance or a stranger.376 
Now ask yourself: does this sort of analysis belong in a criminal proceeding 
where a doctor, in violation of his duty of confidentiality, has disclosed material 
nonpublic information to a hedge fund manager who saved hundreds of millions 
of dollars by trading on the information? What business do federal courts have 
in trying to ferret out the various motivations pursuant to which someone might 
make a gift? 
Moreover, the notion that someone cannot obtain a personal benefit from a 
gift to a stranger reflects a very limited view of human nature. I get more 
pleasure in buying breakfast for a homeless person on a cold winter day than I 
do in giving a gift to my adult children, all of whom are well-off and more than 
capable of purchasing the subject matter of the gift themselves. 
The dissent also quibbled with the jury instructions because they would 
permit a conviction if the doctor gave information to Martoma “as a gift with the 
goal of developing . . . a personal friendship.”377 The dissent was shocked that 
the government could convict someone based upon “a gift between persons who 
are not friends, but might become friends.”378 Consequently, the dissent found 
the instruction clearly erroneous because “whatever counts as a ‘meaningfully 
close’ relationship, a non-existent friendship clearly is not one.”379 The dissent 
 
 374. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 85 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
 375. Id. (Pooler, J., dissenting) (citing majority opinion at 69). 
 376. Id. at 85–86 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (alteration in original). 
 377. Id. at 89 (Pooler, J., dissenting).  
 378. Id. (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
 379. Id. (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
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did not realize that developing a friendship can be as important as maintaining 
one. This is rigidity carried to the extreme. 
But all of this should be irrelevant. There are many reasons why a person 
might give a “gift.” It is not the role of federal courts to play amateur 
psychologist. It is the role of the federal courts to enforce the securities laws and 
to carry out the congressional dictate that the playing field should be level. 
3. Martoma II: Finessing Newman 
 Ten months after the Second Circuit’s opinion in Martoma I, the Second 
Circuit amended that opinion in Martoma II. 380 Rather than announcing that 
Newman’s requirement of a “meaningfully close relationship” was “no longer 
good law,”381 Martoma II looked at the basis for such articulation in Newman, 
namely, that there must be evidence of “a relationship between the insider and 
the recipients that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to 
benefit the [latter],”382 and determined both that there was a quid pro quo and an 
intent to benefit the relationship between Dr. Gilman and Martoma. 
 This approach was probably taken in response to the dissent’s objection in 
Martoma I that the panel could not overrule Newman without convening the 
court en banc.383 
 The Second Circuit, in Martoma II, first observed that the Supreme Court 
had “defined personal benefit broadly.”384 The court then listed the personal 
benefits recognized by the Second Circuit: 
We held that a jury could infer a personal benefit from the fact that a 
tipper “hoped to curry favor with his boss,” and from the fact that 
another tipper and the tippee “were friends from college.” We found 
evidence of a personal benefit sufficient where the tippee gave one 
tipper “an iPhone, live lobsters, a gift card, and a jar of honey,” and 
where the tippee had another tipper admitted into an investment club 
where the tipper “had the opportunity to access information that could 
yield future pecuniary gain” (even though he never realized that 
opportunity). In another case, we held that the government “need not 
show that the tipper expected or received a specific or tangible benefit 
in exchange for the tip,” and that the personal benefit element is 
satisfied where there is evidence that the tipper “intend[ed] to benefit 
the . . . recipient.”385 
 The court, in Martoma II, found both that there was a quid pro quo 
arising from the thousands of dollars in consulting payments paid by 
 
 380. Martoma v. United States, 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018) (Martoma II). 
 381. See Martoma, 869 F.3d at 69. 
 382. Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 69 (“The [Newman] Court explained that this standard ‘requires evidence of a 
relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to 
benefit the [latter].” (quoting United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 383. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 74 (Pooler, J., dissenting). 
 384. Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 73. 
 385. Id. at 74. (citations omitted) (alterations in original). 
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Martoma to Dr. Gilman, and that Dr. Gilman intended to benefit Martoma 
with inside information.386 Relying upon Dirks, the court stated, with 
respect to Dr. Gilman’s intent to benefit Martoma: “We think a jury can 
often infer that a corporate insider receives a personal benefit (i.e., breaches 
his fiduciary duty) from deliberately disclosing valuable, confidential 
information without a corporate purpose and with the expectation that the 
tippee will trade on it.” 387 
 To support its conclusion that Dr. Gilman intended to benefit Martoma, 
the court stated: 
Here, as previously noted, Dr. Gilman knew that Martoma was an 
investment manager who was seeking information on which to base 
securities trading decisions. And Dr. Gilman plainly understood the 
valuable nature of the information about the bapineuzumab clinical 
trial, as Martoma had previously paid him $1,000 per hour over the 
course of 43 consultations to convey his knowledge on the subject, 
and had visited Dr. Gilman in his Ann Arbor office to receive the key 
drug efficacy results firsthand. From these facts, a reasonable jury 
could infer that Dr. Gilman personally benefited by conveying inside 
information about the trial with the purpose of benefiting Martoma, 
even if it was not persuaded that the two had a relationship suggesting 
a quid pro quo (or a personal relationship, for that matter). 388 
 Consequently, the court concluded that Martoma’s substantial rights were 
not affected by a jury instruction that would have permitted him to be convicted 
on the basis that Dr. Gilman tipped him in order to maintain or develop a 
friendship since the evidence more than supported a conclusion that a properly 
instructed jury would also have convicted him on the basis of either a quid pro 
quo or intention to benefit. 
V. LEGISLATION DEFINING INSIDER TRADING 
In connection with both the previously discussed 1984 and 1988 
legislation, Congress considered setting forth the definition of insider trading. 
Senators Riegle and D’Amato received a draft of proposed legislation from a 
distinguished group of securities lawyers led by Harvey Pitt, the former general 
counsel of the SEC, and John Olson, the chairman of the American Bar 
Association’s Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading.389 
 
 386. Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 78. 
 387. Id. at 79. (citations omitted). 
 388. Id. 
 389. Letter from Donald W. Riegel, Jr., Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Securities, to Harvey L. 
Pitt, Lawyer (Mar. 11, 1987), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rack 
cdn.com/collection/papers/1980/1987_0311_PittRiegleT.pdf. Harvey Pitt was the SEC’s twenty-sixth Chairman 
from 2001–2003 and its youngest General Counsel. He was selected as the nineteenth recipient of the William 
O. Douglas Award which honors SEC alumnus who contributed to development of federal securities laws or 
served the SEC community with distinction. SEC Biography: Chairman Harvey L Pitt, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM., https://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/pitt.htm (last visited July 27, 2019). John Olson was named 
Washington, DC Corporate Law Lawyer of the year in 2013 and Washington, DC Corporate Governance Law 
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The proposed legislation had two critical components: trading on material, 
nonpublic information would be unlawful when the trader “knows or is reckless 
in not knowing” that the information has been obtained “wrongfully,” coupled 
with a definition of “wrongful.”390 
The unlawful aspect provides as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to use material, 
non-public information to purchase or sell any security, by the use of any 
means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any 
facilities of any national securities exchange, or of any automated quotation 
system maintained for the trading of securities, if such person knows or is 
reckless in not knowing that such information has been obtained wrongfully, 
or if the purchase or sale of such security would constitute a wrongful use of 
such information.391 
What constitutes wrongful use or acquisition of information is defined as 
follows: “For purposes of this section, information shall have been used or 
obtained wrongfully only if it has been obtained by, or its use would constitute, 
directly or indirectly, theft, conversion, misappropriation or a breach of any 
fiduciary, contractual, employment, personal or other relationship of trust and 
confidence.”392  
In addition, the legislation would prohibit wrongful communication of 
material, non-public information: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, wrongfully to 
communicate material, nonpublic information to another person who, 
directly, or indirectly, purchases or sells any security that is directly or 
indirectly the subject of the communication, while in possession of such 
information, if the person making the communication knows (or is reckless 
in not knowing) that such information would be used for a purchase or sale 
of a security that would violate [the above provisions].393 
The key to the above provisions is that they implicitly remove the 
requirement that the tippee must receive a benefit. As former SEC chairman 
David Ruder pointed out, this legislation “should remove the Dirks requirement 
that in tipping cases a personal benefit to the tipper must be found in order to 
charge the tipper or the tippee.”394 Thus, this legislation would have reversed the 
result in the Dirks case and its progeny, but was never acted on. 
Congress believed that “if the Dirks is properly and narrowly construed by 
the courts, the Commission’s insider trading program will not be adversely 
affected.”395 As the Newman case illustrates, Dirks has been neither properly 
 
Lawyer of the year in 2012 by The Best Lawyers in America. Biography of John F. Olson, GIBSON DUNN, 
https://www.gibsondunn.com/lawyer/olson-john-f/ (last visited July 27, 2019). 
 390. Insider Trading Proscriptions Act, S. 1380, 100th Cong. § 16A(b)(1) (1987). 
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. § 16A(b)(2). 
 393. Id. § 16A(c)(2).  
 394. David Ruder, Chairman, SEC. & EXCH. COMM., Remarks Before the National Investor Relations 
Institute: Recent Developments in Insider Trading Law and Enforcement (Nov. 11, 1987). 
 395. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 15 (1983). 
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construed, nor narrowly construed; rather, the Second Circuit gave a free ride to 
remote tippees who made millions from the tip.  
During the 2000s, insider trading again exploded,396 arguably as a result of 
the rise of hedge funds and their desire to gain an edge on their competitors, a 
black edge if necessary.397 In 2009, Preet Bharara was appointed U.S. Attorney 
for the Southern District of New York and promptly set out to curb insider 
trading. At one point, he had 79 consecutive convictions.398 
As a result of the Newman decision, Congressman Himes introduced a 
bipartisan bill to define insider trading, similar to the bill introduced earlier by 
Senators Riegle and D’Amato, but Himes’ bill specifically provided that 
knowledge of the means by which the information was obtained or any benefit 
to the tipper was not required an element of the crime: 
It shall not be necessary that the person trading while in possession of such 
information . . . or making the communication . . . know the specific means 
by which the information was obtained or communicated, or whether any 
personal benefit was paid or promised by or to any person in the chain of 
communication, so long as the person trading while in possession of such 
information or making the communication, as the case may be, was aware or 
recklessly disregarded that such information was wrongfully obtained or 
communicated.399 
 Congressman Himes set forth the necessity for the legislation as follows:  
The absence of a clear statutory prohibition on insider trading has left us with 
an amorphous body of case law instead of bright lines around what’s legal 
and what isn’t . . . [t]his haziness opens the door to letting wrongdoers walk 
free, and provides uncertainty to those who are genuinely trying to operate 
within the bounds of the law. This isn’t a partisan issue—no one should profit 
from illegally obtained information. The need for a clear definition of insider 
trading is particularly important in an era in which complex trades and 
information literally move at the speed of light. This legislation explicitly 
defines insider trading and will help ensure that bad actors are held 
accountable, protect legitimate investors and strengthen confidence and 
safety in our markets.400 
According to Professor Coffee, a leading expert on securities regulation: 
 
 396. See, e.g., Peter Lattman & Azam Ahmed, Hedge Fund Billionaire Is Guilty of Insider Trading: A Circle 
of Tipsters Who Shared Illicit Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2011), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/ 
galleon-chiefs-network-of-friendswho-tell-secrets/; Wall Street, Held Accountable: The Conviction of a Major 
Hedge Fund Manager Comes at a Moment of Distrust in the Markets, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/12/opinion/12thu1.html. 
 397. See, e.g., BLACK EDGE, supra note 274. 
 398. Jonathan Marino, Preet Bharara Was the Undefeated Top Cop of Wall Street—But Now His Legacy Is 
in Question, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/preet-bharara-was-once-the-
undefeated-top-cop-of-wall-street-but-that-has-all-changed-2015-10. 
 399. Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. § 16A2(c) (2015–2016). 
 400. Press Release, Himes Introduces Bipartisan Bill to Define and Prohibit Illegal Insider Trading (Mar. 
25, 2015), https://himes.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/himes-introduces-bipartisan-bill-define-and-
prohibit-illegal-insider. 
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In my judgment, Congressman Himes has performed a real service in 
producing a draft bill to codify the prohibition on insider trading in a manner 
that is tough, effective and fair . . . [i]t closes the loophole created by the 
[Newman] decision, updates the law to cover computer hacking and other 
newer forms of misappropriation, but does not overcriminalize.401 
Clearly, this legislation would clarify the concept of when trading is illegal, 
by eliminating the knowledge of how the information was obtained requirement 
and the personal benefit requirement. While this should not be necessary, new 
legislation should also clarify that an employee of a corporation holds material 
nonpublic information received in the course of employment solely for the 
corporation’s benefit and would breach his or her fiduciary duty to the 
corporation by any unauthorized disclosure. 
Unfortunately, Congress was focused on the upcoming election and the 
Supreme Court vacancy, and this legislation also did not advance. 
CONCLUSION 
The committee report accompanying the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 
1984 referred to Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulfur as “seminal cases.”402 
While Justice Powell, in Chiarella and Dirks also referred to these cases as 
seminal, he not only misinterpreted these cases, but unfathomably asserted that 
they held the opposite. The committee report noted that there was concern about 
the Dirks decision but noted that “the Court acknowledged . . . the Dirks case 
had unique facts.”403 The committee then stated that “if the Dirks decision is 
properly and narrowly construed by the courts, the Commission’s insider trading 
program will not be adversely affected.”404 Rather than narrowly construing 
Dirks, the Second Circuit carried it to its illogical extreme in Newman. 
After 1983, the lower federal courts had little choice but to follow Justice 
Powell’s severely flawed analysis in Dirks. However, lower courts could have 
followed Congress’s recommendation that the Dirks holding be limited to its 
very unusual facts, rather than expanding the limitations upon effective policing 
of insider trading. The Newman court did not limit Dirks, choosing instead to 
require that the penultimate head of a “club” passing along material, nonpublic 
inside information—namely, the portfolio manager who could amass tens of 
millions of dollars through insider trading—must know of the benefit received 
by the initial tipper—a person who breached his fiduciary duty to his employer 
by disclosing the information. 
The Supreme Court, in Salman, though not dealing with the massive insider 
trading schemes developed by hedge funds and other large trading entities, 
rejected Newman’s notion that a tipper must also receive something of a 
 
 401. Id. 
 402. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 14 (1983). 
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. at 15. 
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“pecuniary or similarly valuable nature”405 in exchange for a gift of inside 
information. Building upon Salman, the Second Circuit, in Martoma II, then 
determined that it was not necessary to establish Newman’s requirement of a 
“meaningfully close personal relationship” between the tipper and tippee, in 
order to use the gift analogy of Dirks. Rather, to meet the personal benefit 
requirement, it was necessary only to establish either a quid pro quo or an intent 
by the tipper to benefit the tippee. 
There are several practical problems with Newman. As Sheelah Kolhatkar, 
a former hedge fund analyst and later a staff writer for The New Yorker, noted, 
the basic problem with Newman “is that it completely misunderstood the way 
the world actually works.”406 For the Newman court, defendants’ lack of 
culpability stemmed from the fact that “Newman and Chiasson were several 
steps removed from the corporate insiders,” since Newman and Chiasson were 
three and four levels removed from the inside tipper, respectively, “and there 
was no evidence that either was aware of the source of the inside information.”407  
The Newman court failed to realize that this is the way the game is played. 
The portfolio manager orders trades, which make millions for the organization, 
and indirectly for the analysts and others who feed information to the portfolio 
manager. All of these people are aware of the risks of insider trading and, when 
a dark edge is employed, want to obfuscate insider trading as much as possible. 
For example, in the SAC Capital situation, Steve Cohen received reports 
in a specified formant, the most important element of which was the requirement 
that recommendations have a “conviction” rating from 1 to 10 as to the strength 
of the recommendation: 
A conviction rating of 10 was reserved for “absolute certainty,” a level that 
would seem to be impossible to achieve through conventional research 
methods. How could a person be 100 percent certain about any event in the 
future, let alone the performance of a stock? The rating was how traders 
communicated the value of their information to Cohen without exposing him 
to the details of how they knew something. Cohen relied on it to decide 
whether to buy for his own account. The rating system had been the idea of 
the compliance department, which was always trying to ways to protect 
Cohen and keep him from explicitly receiving material nonpublic 
information—it was like a moat around the company’s most valuable 
asset.408 
It is critical for courts to understand the pressures to receive illegal 
information, the chain through which it travels, where it must end in order to be 
operational, and the devices to disguise the illegal sources. 
Courts also need to understand that much of the world operates on 
networking and relationships, and that people are motivated by factors other than 
 
 405. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 425 (2016). 
 406. Stewart, supra note 321. Sheelah Kolhatkar is the author of BLACK EDGE, supra note 274, a three-year 
study of the skullduggery that inheres in much of the hedge fund industry. 
 407. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 408. BLACK EDGE, supra note 274, at 95. 
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immediate pecuniary gain. For example, Martoma preyed on Dr. Gilman’s 
loneliness and the loss of his two sons.409 Martoma, by creating a relationship 
with Dr. Gilman, might have induced Dr. Gilman to provide the inside 
information without any pecuniary benefit. However, in a world that is often 
selfish and greedy, Justice Powell and some other federal jurists unfortunately 
failed to understand that people can be motivated by something other than 
money.  
But there are indeed huge sums of money to be gained through the 
improper use of inside information. The insider trading in Texas Gulf Sulfur, 
Chiarella, and Dirks was fairly modest. The employees in Texas Gulf Sulfur 
traded a few hundred to a few thousand shares.410 Chiarella realized a gain of 
slightly more than $30,000 in the course of 14 months.411 And Dirks’ tippees 
avoided a loss of about $6 million.412 
By way of contrast, the defendants in Newman earned $72 million in profits 
for their respective funds; in Martoma, the tippees realized $80.3 million in gains 
and $194.6 million in averted losses.413 “Martoma personally received a $9 
million bonus based in large part on his trading activity in Elan and Wyeth.”414 
Today, the hedge fund industry is a $3 trillion industry in which the participants 
seek any edge to enable their results to outperform their competitors.415 
In 1970, daily trading volume as high as 20 million shares was unusual, 
and average trading volume was about 12 million shares.416 Today, trading 
volume of 3 billion shares is not unusual,417 and trading volume can range from 
2 billion to 6 billion shares. If the “potential for immense profits [was] a 
powerful lure” for insider trading in the 1970s and 1980s, that risk is almost 
exponentially greater in today’s supercharged world. 
Congress has stated that the purpose of securities regulation is to ensure a 
level playing field where one participant does not have an undue advantage over 
another participant. Congress also was of the opinion that a legislative definition 
 
 409. Id. at 97. 
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of insider trading was not necessary. That may well be the case if other federal 
courts follow the lead of the Martoma court and recognize that, when a corporate 
employee breaches his fiduciary duty by disclosing material, nonpublic 
information outside his or her employer to someone who may trade on the basis 
of such information, the person who trades on the basis of this wrongfully 
obtained information is guilty of insider trading. Moreover, a market 
professional who obtains material nonpublic information himself or herself has 
a responsibility to know the source of such information and should not be able 
to use ignorance as an excuse.  
If federal courts do not have the wisdom to follow the lead of the Second 
Circuit in Martoma, then Congress should act. But, in today’s politically 
polarized world, acting rationally may be too much to hope for. 
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